The 91st Congress and the Constitution
Abner J.Mihvat
Joseph R. Lundyf

Every member of Congress, upon taking office, is required to repeat an
oath to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States." 1
In theory then, each member is under a duty to judge the constitutionality of legislative proposals. Moreover, as a practical matter, each member should evaluate the constitutional status of each legislative proposal
if only because a charge of constitutional infirmity may impair a
proposal's chance of passage.
In terms of these theoretical and practical responsibilities to consider
constitutional issues in the legislative process, the most recent Congress
is not likely to be recorded a winner. The 91st Congress met from
January, 1969, until December 31, 1970. During this period, countless
instances arose in which the constitutional power of the national legislature was (or should have been) drawn into question. Of course,
constitutional issues, like all other issues considered by Congress, inevitably arise in a broader context. Indeed, it is often political or
parliamentary factors that determine how-and whether-constitutional questions are ever considered. Nevertheless, a detailed examination of a few of those instances where constitutional questions were
raised will perhaps illuminate the attitudes and performances of the
members of Congress with regard to their constitutional responsibilities.
In choosing which instances to consider, we met with our first difficult
decision. Among the thousands of bills considered during any Congress,
a high proportion involve some constitutional implications. We have
chosen four issues considered by the 91st Congress which demonstrate
some variations on the theme that, for Congress, the Constitution is a
sometimes thing.
The four issues are: (1) the extent to which Congress may encroach
t-Member of the United States House of Representatives, Second District of Illinois;
member of the Illinois Bar.
ft Legislative Assistant to Congressman Mikva during 91st Congress; member of the
District of Columbia Bar.
1 The oath of office is constitutionally required of all members of both the House and
Senate, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3, and the form of the oath is prescribed by 5 U.S.C. § 16
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upon the first amendment freedom of association in the interests of
safeguarding non-governmental defense production facilities; (2) the
compatibility of preventive detention prior to trial with the constitutional safeguards contained in the eighth amendment and the due process clause of the fifth amendment; (3) the constitutionality of lowering
the voting age in local, state and national elections by congressional
statute; and (4) the relative constitutional responsibilities of the President and Congress for involving the United States in an armed conflict
abroad, specifically the Cambodian invasion of April, 1970.
If some of the description reflects more heat than light, it is because
the authors were more than mere observers of the 91st Congress and
because they believe the Constitution ought not be a document that one
can take or leave alone. In any event, we turn to the 91st.
I. H.R. 14864,

DEFENSE FACILITIES AND INDUSTMIAL SECURITIES ACT
OF

1970

Section 5 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 19502 authorized
a program to protect "defense facilities," that is, non-governmental installations engaged in industrial production essential to the defense of
the United States, against subversion. Section 5(a)(1)(D) of the Act
provided that when a Communist-action organization 3 was under a final
order to register as such with the Subversive Activities Control Board,4
it was unlawful for any member of that organization "to engage in any
employment in any defense facility."
In 1967, however, the Supreme Court in United States v. Robel5
invalidated section 5(a)(1)(D) on the grounds of overbreadth. Specifically, Chief Justice Warren, speaking for a majority of the Court, affirmed the dismissal of an indictment against Robel in these terms:
That statute casts its net across a broad range of associational
activities, indiscriminately trapping membership which can be
constitutionally punished and membership which cannot be so
proscribed. It is made irrelevant to the statute's operation that
2 § 5(a)(1)(D), 50 U.S.C. § 784(a)(1)(D) (1964).
3 § 3(3)(a) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. § 782(3)(a) (1964), defines a "Communist-action organization" as:
any organization in the United States (other than a diplomatic representative or
mission of a foreign government accredited as such by the Department of State)
which (i) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by the foreign
government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement
. and (ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives of such world Communist
movement . . . .
4 In Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 867 U.S. 1, 105 (1961), the
Supreme Court sustained an order of the SACB requiring the Communist Party of the
United States to register as a Communist-action organization under the Act.
5 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
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an individual may be a passive or inactive member of a designated organization, that he may be unaware of the organization's unlawful aims, or that he may disagree with those unlawful aims. It is also made irrelevant that an individual who is
subject to the penalties of § 5(a)(1)(D) may occupy a nonsensitive position in a defense facility. Thus, § 5(a)(1)(D) contains
the fatal defect of overbreadth because it seeks to bar employment both for association which may be proscribed and for
association which may not be proscribed consistently with
First Amendment rights. 6
The Court relied on its earlier decision in Aptheker v. Secretary of
State,7 which first drew the distinction between passive and active membership, and interpreted the Smith Act's membership clause as requiring "a defendant to have knowledge of the organization's illegal advocacy, a requirement that 'was intimately connected with the construction limiting membership to "active" members.' "8
In response to Robel and other cases, 9 the Internal Security Committee of the House of Representatives [HISC] 1 ° began work on H.R.
14864, the Defense Facilities and Industrial Security Act of 1970.11 The
congressional consideration of this Act presents a sharp conflict between
the desire of Congress to legislate broadly to protect production facilities by establishing employee screening programs and the first amendment's requirement that laws relating to the sensitive areas of political
association and belief be narrowly drawn and limited. The response of
the House of Representatives to the Court's interpretation of the power
to legislate in this delicate area provides a clue to the significance of constitutional scholarship in the legislative process.
On December 16, 1969, the Internal Security Committee reported
H.R. 14864 to the House of Representatives with a recommendation for
favorable action. 12 The HISC report emphasized Chief Justice Warren's
statement in Robel that although section 5(a)(1)(D) was void for over6 Id. at 265-66.
7 378 U.S. 500 (1964).

8 389 U.S. at 262, citing Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 US. 500, 511 n.9 (1964).
9 E.g., Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968), in which the Court struck down a
personnel screening program for access to merchant vessels and waterfront facilities on the
ground that it was not expressly or impliedly authorized by Congress in the Magnuson
Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 191 (1964).
10 The House Committee on Internal Security was formerly known as the House
Un-American Activities Committee. For reasons best known to the members of the

Committee, a successful effort was made to change the Committee's designation in early
1969. H.R. Res. 89, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., 116 CONG. RFc. 3745-47 (1969).
11 H.R. 14864, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969).
12 H.R. RE. No. 91-757, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1969) [hereinafter cited as HISC REPoRT].
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breadth, the Court did not prohibit all congressional action to protect
defense facilities.
We are not unmindful of the congressional concern over the
danger of sabotage and espionage in national defense industries, and nothing we hold today should be read to deny
Congress the power under narrowly drawn legislation to keep
from sensitive positions in defense facilities those who would
use their positions to disrupt the Nation's production facilities.13
The legislative scheme to control access to defense facilities was
simple in outline, if somewhat less than "narrowly drawn." H.R. 14864
would add a new fourth title to the Internal Security Act of 1950, captioned "Defense Facilities and Industrial Security Act of 1970." Section
405 of this new title would authorize the President to establish "screening programs to determine authorization for access to sensitive positions
in defense facilities .... The ultimate standard for determining authorization is that the granting of such authorization be 'clearly consistent
with the national defense interest.' "14
Section 404 of the proposed act specified procedures for designating
defense facilities and for determining which positions and areas within
those facilities were to be restricted to persons who had survived the
screening process. In deference to Robel the Committee took some
pains to make it appear that the kinds of defense facilities and positions
which could be included in the screening program were carefully
limited.
For example, section 402 of the new title contained elaborate definitions of such terms as "facilities," "sensitive," "act of subversion," "association," and "affiliation." In addition, to be brought within the program, facilities had to be engaged in classified military projects, production of important weapons systems or their components, production of
basic raw materials important to military production or mobilization,
or "important utility and service" functions. Finally, in response to the
Court's observation that section 5 of the 1950 Act made no distinction
between sensitive and nonsensitive positions, the committee bill
provided that "[t]he Secretary of Defense shall designate the positions,
places, and areas of employment
in any defense facility which he de15
termines to be sensitive.'
To many members of the House, the Committee's attempt to produce
"narrowly drawn legislation" was a hopeless failure. In the first place,
18 889 US. at 266-67, cited in HISC REPORT at 7-8.
14 HISC RFPoRT at 24.
15 Id. at 42.
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the Committee's definitions were riddled with terms having no legal
significance and left almost complete discretion to defense officials administering the program. For example, the requirement that defense
facilities be engaged in "important" classified military projects, or in
production of "important weapons, or defense systems, their subassemblies and components" would have brought within the program's
reach virtually every one of the hundreds of thousands of employees of
United States defense contractors and subcontractors. Moreover, the
definition of "facility" covered
any manufacturing, producing, or service establishment, enterprise or legal entity, any plant, factory, industry, public
utility, mine, laboratory, educational institution, research
organization, railroad, airport, pier, waterfront installation,
canal, dam, bridge, highway, vessel, aircraft, vehicle, pipeline,
or any part, division, department, or activity of any of the
foregoing."6
In light of such sweeping definitions, the Committee's assertion that
its proposal was ".... drafted with the most scrupulous attention to the
pronouncements of the courts in Robel [and other cases]," and that it
would ".... meet with the most rigorous requirements of the majority
and concurring opinions in that case,"lv can hardly be taken seriously.
A.

The Threat to AssociationalFreedom
The most dangerous provision of H.R. 14864-and the most patently
unconstitutional provision in light of Robel-was subsection 405(c).
That subsection authorized the President "to establish criteria and to
undertake investigations" to carry out the screening programs established in the Act. Although the Committee argued that "the criteria
and investigations ... will be within the respective limitations, standards, and purposes expressed in sections 404 and 405 . . . " we have
seen that these limitations were practically nonexistent. The ultimate
purpose of these criteria and investigations, it will be remembered, was
to determine whether granting of access to a sensitive position in a
defense facility was "clearly consistent with the national defense interest." A standard which would provide the administrator of the screening program with broader discretion is difficult to imagine.
And what was the scope of the criteria and investigations which the
President was authorized to establish and conduct under section 405(c)?
What were the individual characteristics and activities which would be
open to government investigation and review-and which might be the
16 Id. at 40.
17

Id. at 8.
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basis for denial of any of a broad range of jobs in private industry?
Criteria could be established and investigations undertaken
regarding any such person's present or past membership in, or
affiliation or association with, any organization, and such other
activities, behavior, associations, facts, and conditions, past or
present, which are relevant to any determination to be made
under the provisions of this section.""
Thus, with the sole limitation that the inquiry or criteria must be
"relevant" to determinations to be made as part of the screening program, investigators and administrators were free to deny employment
in a defense facility to any person based on his membership, passive or
active, or even his association, 19 knowing or innocent, with "any organization," as well as on the basis of any person's activities, behavior, associations, facts or conditions. The sole limitation, if a limitation it can
be called, was the administrator's notion of what was "relevant" to the
inquiry or determination.
The work product of the HISC always involves a special set of pluses
and minuses. As the legitimate descendant of the House Un-American
Activities Committee, many members support the HISC with special
zeal and consider any recommendation of the HISC as scripture. Others
remember the excesses of the Committee under Martin Dies and Parnell
Thomas, and react adversely with equal zeal. A third group of Congressmen think the whole subject matter is passe, but, politics being what it
is, do not relish answering the charge of being "soft on communism"
that might follow a vote against the HISC.
To complicate the picture further, Richard H. Ichord of Missouri,
the present chairman, is not in the Dies-Thomas mold, and prides
himself on his reasonableness. There is no doubt that the circuses of
earlier days are no longer countenanced. Indeed, during the entire 91st
Congress, only one witness was cited for contempt of HISC, which is
probably the lowest number of casualties since Dies began over thirty
years ago.
With these facts in mind, opponents of H.R. 14864 began to act. The
Washington Office of the American Civil Liberties Union noted in a
letter to all members of the House the broad coverage of the proposed
bill and made a plea for its rejection. The letter quoted a telling passage from Robel:
18 Id. at 42.
19 "(8) The term 'association,' as applied to a person's conduct, means a person's
activities, or other objective manifestation of conduct, in relation to another person or

organization."
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It would, indeed, be ironic, if in the name of national defense,
we would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties-the
freedom of association-which makes the defense of the Nation
worthwhile.

20

In addition, soon after the Committee issued its report, opponents
within the House met to fashion amendments to H.R. 14864 which
would narrow its overbroad scope. 21 The emphasis on legal argumentation in the Committee report made it clear that here was where the
majority members of the HISC felt the bill to be most vulnerable. The
Committee knew it could be attacked as trying to resurrect the old Subversive Activities Control Act despite the Court's decision in Robel.
Thus, the problem for those opposing the bill was to draft amendments
which would clearly illustrate its unconstitutionality.
The opponents received invaluable support from Congressman Stokes
of Cleveland, a member of the Committee, who filed a blistering dissent
to the Committee report. He noted:
In a very distinct sense, H.R. 14864 represents a step not
forward but backward in progress. Its provisions are so capable
of nearly infinite expansion that they contain the dangerous
potential for an unprecedented assault on fundamental rights
which were protected from the now invalidated section 5 of
22
the Subversive Activities Control Act.

Congressman Stokes noted that the bill's most salient weakness, in light
of the requirement for precision which the Court had imposed, was its
"failure to provide any meaningful standard by which the President can
23
make the determinations with which he is charged.1
At this point, Chairman Ichord undertook an extraordinary mea20 Letter from Lawrence Speiser, Director, Washington Office, American Civil Liberties
Union, January 27, 1970, citing 389 U.S. at 264.
21 One is always tempted at such strategy conferences to yield to the urge to devise
amendments which will render a bad bill still worse in hopes that it will die in the
Senate or be vetoed by the President. Such strategies have been known to backfire,
however. This is reportedly the way in which the outrageous Emergency Detention Act,
Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950, was added to the Subversive Activities
Control Act. A group of liberal Senators conceived Title II in hopes that its patent
unconstitutionality would force the President to veto the bill. President Truman, on the
advice of the Department of Justice, Department of Defense, Department of State, and Central Intelligence Agency, did veto the bill, but it was subsequently passed by Congress
over his veto. H.R. Doc. No. 708, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1950).
In his veto message, President Truman noted that "the language of the bill is so
broad and vague that it might well result in penalizing the legitimate activities of people
who are not Communists at all, but loyal citizens." Id. at 3, cited in United States v.
Robel, 389 U.S. 258 n.1 (1967).
22

HISC R1Poar at 57 (dissenting views of Congressman Stokes).

23

Id. at 58.
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sure-a rebuttal of Congressman Stokes' dissent. After the report with
dissenting views became available, only three days before H.R. 14864
was scheduled to come before the House, Chairman Ichord sent to each
member of the House a 22-page, single-spaced letter and legal brief
rebutting the legal constitutional arguments advanced by Congressman
Stokes. The letter was particularly unusual in the personal tone and
defensive nature of its argumentation.
To support the constitutionality of the proposed bill, Chairman
Ichord cited the testimony of Assistant Attorney General J. Walter
Yeagley, head of the Justice Department's Internal Security Division,
before the Internal Security Committee on a predecessor bill to H.R.
14863. Yeagley stated:
We have no way of knowing in any case whether we are going
to win a constitutional test. The same would be true of this
program with or without congressional authorization.
24
We think that it would be held constitutional.
This grudging endorsement was reminiscent of the Justice Department's position taken in a letter to Chairman Ichord on September 8,
1969. Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst noted:
While the proposed Section 405(c) would specifically touch on
associational freedoms, and First Amendment issues would no
doubt be encountered in its administration, the provision itself would appear to meet objections of the Court as to unlimited and indiscriminate inquiries, since only reasonable inquiries relevant to making the required determination would
25
be authorized.
B. Floor Considerationof H.R. 14864
Floor debate on H.R. 14864 opened with a long statement of support
by Chairman Ichord. 26 The Chairman was followed by several congressmen who spoke in general terms about the need to protect defense
production facilities from subversives, but said little specifically about
the bill's constitutionality. Attendance on the floor was, as is often the
case, low.
The first amendment offered to the bill was by Representative Mink
of Hawaii. Her proposal was to insure that where an educational
institution was engaged in a classified project, only that part of the
institution directly engaged in such work would be included in the
24 116 CoNG. REc. 499 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1970).
25 HISO RtPoRr at 33. There was no requirement in the bill that inquiries be reasonable.
26 116 CONG. R1c. 489-504 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1970).
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definition of a "defense facility." Surprisingly, the amendment passed
by a voice vote. 27 Next, Representative Eckhardt of Texas offered an
amendment to guarantee that the rights of confrontation and crossexamination would not be forfeited in a hearing under the employee
screening procedure without a court order. Mr. Eckhardt's amendment
was defeated on a standing vote by 13-37.28
Finally, an amendment was offered which went to the heart of section
405(c) of the bill, the section which authorized the President to establish
criteria and undertake investigations of organizational and individual
associations "relevant" to the screening procedure. The amendment
would have required that the organizational or individual activities
inquired into or used as the basis for criteria must be or have been illegal, and that an individual's membership must be or have been "active
membership." Active membership in an organization was specifically
defined as
such active participation in and support of its activities as
goals and a specific
evidences a knowledge of the organization's
29
intent to support and further those goals.
In explanation of the amendment, its author stated on the House floor:
My amendment would limit the situations in which the
President could establish criteria to those in which there is
active, knowledgeable and knowing membership in the organization. Unless it is so narrowly defined, we are again going
through the same exercise that Congress went through in passing the original act ....
I suggest to you that under the language that is in the bill,
unamended, the President could make inquiry and set criteria
having to do with Vietnam war opponents, draft resisters,
student activists, civil rights workers, labor organizers or just
political partisans. 30
A colloquy ensued during which Chairman Ichord attacked the
amendment as inadequate to protect the national interest in excluding
all "undesirables" from employment in defense facilities. 3 1 A standing
vote was taken in which the amendment was defeated 25-35.32 Later the
same day H.R. 14864 passed the House by a record vote of 274-65, with
93 members not voting.3 3 Notwithstanding Chairman Ichord's zeal, the
27 Id. at 527-28.
28 Id. at 528-30.
29 Id. at 550-31.
So Id. at 551.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 552.
83 Id. at 535.
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bill eventually died a silent death in the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee
on Internal Security. While the ways of that Subcommittee are mysterious and frequently beyond analysis, it is a safe guess that there was an
overwhelming lack of interest. It would be too speculative to suggest
that the constitutional argument influenced the Senate's decision to
inter the bill.
C.

The Weight of ConstitutionalArgumentation

Several identifiable characteristics of constitutional argumentation in
Congress emerged during House consideration of H.R. 14864. First,
the most careful and thorough study of all legislation, including that
which presents constitutional problems, occurs in the committee of
jurisdiction. Thus, if the committee does not give sufficient consideration to the constitutional implications of proposed legislation, it is unlikely that such consideration will occur, or at least will carry much
weight, after a bill reaches the House floor.
A second characteristic of House consideration of H.R. 14864, which
appears again in the subsequent studies of other legislation, is the extreme difficulty in making a clearly convincing case on one side or the
other of a disputed constitutional issue. To non-lawyer members of the
House and to those lawyers who cannot take time to study the issues in
depth, such divided opinion means that almost inevitably constitutional
arguments are resolved not by force of logic, but by the weight of numbers, or by an overwhelming presumption in favor of the Committee
majority.
A third unexpected and disturbing aspect of House consideration of
H.R. 14864 was that proponents of the bill, particularly Chairman
Ichord, seemed considerably more conscientious and careful in their
constitutional argumentation than did some of those opposing it. Opponents of the bill often seemed content to rely simply on superficial or
emotional reactions to the bill, rather than to delve into the cases to
bottom their arguments. Thus, Chairman Ichord's charge that opponents of his bill chose "to rely principally on invective rather than on
reasoned argumentation" had some validity.34 This is not to say that a
convincing case was not made against H.R. 14864 on constitutional
grounds. Rather, some opponents of the bill relied only slightly on the
constitutional arguments, using instead a "guilt by association" rationale to oppose any product of HISC.3 5
34 Id.

at 498.

35 The phenomenon was even more obvious when HISC brought in a contempt citation

against a witness who refused to take the oath, in opposition not to the oath, but rather
to the Committee's functioning. Some 14 members of the House voted against the citation
without any meaningful expression of reasons or basis. See 116 CONG. tc.'_9086 (daily

ed. Sept. 28, 1970).
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Finally, it must be concluded that in the rough and tumble of
parliamentary debate, careful, meticulous reasoning about matters of
constitutional interpretation comes in a very poor second to arguments
of urgent necessity, debate on issues of public policy, and-not infrequently-sheer emotion. Careful and precise legal and logical distinctions are far more difficult to make, or at least to make convincingly,
on the floor of the House than before the bench.
Perhaps this last feature of constitutional debate in Congress should
not surprise us. Perhaps it explains why, despite each member's oath to
uphold the Constitution, it has always been the Supreme Court-and
not Congress-which has given the Constitution the care and support
it needs.
II.

H.R. 12806, H.R. 16196, PREVENTiVE DETENTION

Probably no single issue raised greater public furor or resulted in
deeper soul-searching and more violent constitutional disputation in
Congress than the Nixon Administration's proposal for preventive
detention of "dangerous" defendants prior to trial.36
In 1966, under the leadership of Senator Sam Ervin, Congress passed
the Bail Reform Act of 1966. 3 7 The purpose of the Bail Reform Act
was to eliminate the seemingly unconstitutional 38 and widely criticized
practice of levying exorbitant money bail in order to detain defendants
who judges felt ought not to be released before trial. This practice, of
course, most heavily burdened the poor. thus, two classes of defendants
were created: those, such as organized gangsters and white collar
criminals, who could post bond no matter how high it was set and no
matter how heinous their alleged crimes, and less well-heeled defendants, usually those accused of crimes of violence or passion, who
could almost never post money bond and either relied on exorbitant
bail bondsmen's charges or stayed in jail pending trial.
The Bail Reform Act required federal judges to release a defendant
on his own recognizance after determining what conditions of release
would best assure his appearance for trial. Unlike bail proceedings
36 The Nixon Administration's preventive detention proposal appeared in two separate
but related bills. H.R. 12806, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). was a proposal to establish
preventive detention of dangerous defendants in all federal courts. Since the bill affected
federal courts generally, it was referred to the House Judiciary Committee as was an
identical bill introduced in the Senate. H.R. 16196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), by contrast,
was an omnibus court reform and criminal procedure revision bill which applied only to
the District of Columbia. Because of its limited territorial effect, it was referred to the
House District of Columbia Committee. Although the preventive detention schemes in
each bill were identical, the difference in the respective committees of jurisdiction was to
have a decisive effect on the success of the two bills.
37 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141 et seq. (Supp. V. 1965-69).
38 See note 40 infra.
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which take place after conviction and pending appeal, 9 the pretrial
bail determination could not include any consideration of the defendant's potential danger to the community. This was in line with
the historical-and many believed constitutional-concept of bail as a
means of assuring only that a defendant would appear for trial.4 0
The Bail Reform Act created a number of problems for trial judges,
appellate judges, prosecutors and law enforcement officials. In the first
place, federal criminal trials, like civil and criminal trials in almost
every court in the nation, were hopelessly backlogged. Years of inadequate resources and inefficient management had so jammed the wheels
of justice that they appeared to be barely turning. Often it would be
months-sometimes years-before an accused defendant would be
brought to trial.4 1 This long delay between arrest and trial was one
factor which made the incarceration of defendants unable to post high
money bail so intolerable. But it also meant that once the Bail Reform
Act had been passed, the time during which an accused was free-perhaps to commit another crime-was unconscionably long. Although no
reliable figures on crime committed by defendants released prior to trial
were produced until well after the introduction of preventive detention
proposals,42 constant agitation by law enforcement interests, including
the highest levels of the Justice Department, unduly magnified the
incidence of pretrial crime by defendants out on bail.
The long delay between arrest and trial was important in another
way which, for quite obvious reasons, was rarely mentioned by pro39 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (Supp. V, 1965-69).

40 "The right to release before trial is conditioned upon the accused's giving adequate
assurance that he will stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty.... Bail set at a

higher figure than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is excessive
under the Eighth Amendment." Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1951).
41 On July 17, 1970, Senator Ervin placed in the Congressional Record a chart showing
the amount of time which 1,408 inmates of the D.C. Jail had been awaiting trial as of
May 2 of that year. 170 of these inmates had been waiting 12 months or longer, 24 had

been waiting 24 months or longer, and 4 prisoners had been in jail for 36 months or
more awaiting trial. 116 CONG. R c. S11683 (daily ed. July 17, 1970). This was after bail
reform-presenting somewhat of a mockery to the oratory about the presumption of innocence.
42 At the time the House of Representatives considered the D.C. crime bill, including

preventive detention, a study was underway by the United States Bureau of Standards to
study the actual incidence of crime committed by persons released prior to trial.

Mysteriously, the results of the study-which showed the amount of crime by pretrial
releasees to be actually quite low-were withheld until the House completed consideration
of the Administration's preventive detention proposals for the District of Columbia. Statements critical of the timing of the release of study results, and of the exaggeration and
misinformation which had played such a large part in the publicity campaign for preventive detention were placed in the Congressional Record by several members of Congress.
See, e.g., Mikva, Study Refutes Claims for Preventive Detention, 116 CONG. Rac. E3465-67

(daily ed. Apr. 21, 1970).
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ponents of preventive detention. Our system of criminal justice has
traditionally relied on the deterrent effect of the criminal sanction.
Whether or not well-founded,43 this belief in the deterrent effect of the
criminal law has been the bedrock of our approach to controlling antisocial behavior. In theory, at least, the sanction was to come into play
only after a trial and conviction-only after guilt had been established
beyond a reasonable doubt. Preventive detention, however, relies only
on the predictive powers of the judge, and since even innocent persons
may be incarcerated under such a scheme the effectiveness of the normal
criminal sanction is seriously diluted.
The response of the Department of Justice to the increasing agitation
by law enforcement authorities against pretrial release of defendants
considered "dangerous" was not to rely on court reorganization and
improved management techniques to speed the trial process;4 it was to
45
propose preventive detention.
For our purposes, the details of the preventive detention scheme put
forth by the Nixon Administration merit careful description. The
prosecutor (in the District of Columbia, the United States Attorney)
was to make the initial determination to resort to preventive detention
of an arrested suspect. The prosecutor's discretion in this decision was
not untrammeled, since he could resort to preventive detention only
if the suspect (1) was accused of a violent crime (as defined in the
proposal), (2) was accused of a dangerous crime (again, as defined in
the bill) and had been convicted within the preceding ten years of a
previous violent crime or was on probation or parole at the time of the
alleged second offense, or (3) had threatened witnesses in his upcoming
trial. The definitions of "violent" and "dangerous" crimes were quite
broad, including as a "violent crime" such offenses as statutory rape and
as a "dangerous crime" such offenses as purse snatching.46
43 A number of recent studies of American criminal justice have raised some doubts
about the efficacy of the deterrent effect of the criminal sanction. See, e.g., H. PACKER, THE
LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1969); N. MoRIS & G. HAWKINs, THm HoNESr Poumrc.N's GumE To CRIME ComoL (1970); Andenaes, The Morality of Deterrence,37 U. Cm. L.
REV. 649, 663-64 (1970).
44 In Great Britain, whose system of justice still serves as a theoretical model to ours,
defendants are regularly brought to trial in a matter of weeks. Defendants accused of
particularly heinous crimes may be tried in as little as a few days. These facts often were
ignored by those who pointed to the fact that the British system allows a form of preventive detention.
45 Although the Administration began by calling its proposal "preventive detention,"
it later became more convenient to refer to it as "pretrial detention." This presumably
avoided the embarrassing question of what exactly was being "prevented," an especially
difficult question in light of the vague standards provided to a judicial officer in determining the propriety of preventively detaining an accused defendant.
46 116 CONG. REc. H2046 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1970).
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Once the prosecutor decided to seek preventive detention, a hearing
before a judicial officer was required. Rules of evidence would not apply
in this hearing, and the judicial decision was to be made on the somewhat broad guidelines of whether the defendant was "a danger to any
other person or the community" and whether there was a "substantial
47
probability" of guilt.

Finally,, there were some post-incarceration provisions such as appeal
of the preventive detention determination, and a requirement that
detention be reviewed if the suspect is not brought to trial within 60
48
days.
A.

Committee Considerationof Preventive Detention

The administration's preventive detention proposal, as first submitted
to Congress, would have been applicable in all federal courts.49 In this
form, the proposal was referred to the Judiciary Committees in both the
House and Senate. These committees, by congressional tradition, are
composed entirely of lawyers, some of whom, such as Senator Sam Ervin
47 The effect of this initial finding of "substantial probability of guilt" on the later
conduct of a trial was never adequately dealt with by proponents of the bill. There were
some restrictions-although not a complete prohibition-on the subsequent use of testimony
taken at a preventive detention hearing. But not much was said about the effect of a
finding of substantial probability of guilt, made on a "clear and convincing evidence"
standard, on the later finding of guilt or innocence by a "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard.
48 It was never clear what would happen to one who had been previously detained and
not brought to trial within sixty days. The final version of the D.C. crime bill, S. 2601,
provided that "[s]uch person shall be treated in accordance with section 23-1821 ....
H.R. REP. No. 91-1303, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 194 (1970). Although § 21-1321 was titled
"Release in non-capital cases prior to trial," it specifically provided that a defendant
should be released only when a judicial officer could fashion release conditions which
would "assure the appearance of the person as required [for trial] and the safety of any
other person or the community." Id. at 191. If such release conditions could not be
fashioned, then the person was to be treated under § 23-1322, the preventive detention
section. Since the reason that the defendant had been subject to preventive detention
in the first place was because no release conditions could be fashioned to assure his appearance and the community's safety, it seemed likely if not inevitable that the sixty-day
review would come to the same conclusion as the initial pretrial determination. Senator
Ervin, in opposing the preventive detention sections of the D.C. crime bill, made much of
this "preventive detention merry-go-round."
It was also a mystery why a preventively detained defendant was eligible for review of
his detention after sixty days since existing statistics indicated that criminal trials in the
District of Columbia could not be completed in that amount of time. Senator Ervin's
statistics on length of detention before trial, note 41 supra, showed that only 733 defendants out of 1,408 awaiting trial had been incarcerated for less than two months. The
counterproductivity of the sixty-day review period was further compounded by the
probability that the sixty-day incarceration would enhance the "dangerousness" of the
defendant, because of loss of job, breaking of family and community ties, and the general
"finishing school" characteristics of local jails.
49 H.R. 12806, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). See note 36 supra.
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and Congressman Richard Poff, are regarded highly for their constitutional expertise. If the preventive detention bills came out of the House
and Senate Judiciary Committees, it was virtually certain that the
lawyers on those committees had resolved any doubts about the proposal's constitutionality.
Hearings were held before Senator Ervin's Constitutional Rights
Subcommittee in the Senate and before Subcommittee No. 4, chaired
by Congressman Byron Rogers, in the House. Testimony was received
in both subcommittees from a wide range of witnesses, including the
American Bar Association's Sections on Criminal Law and Individual
Rights and Responsibilities, various metropolitan bar associations, 0
legal scholars, practicing lawyers and law enforcement personnel.
Although there were numerous arguments against preventive detention on policy grounds,5 1 two principal arguments dominated the
dialogue about preventive detention. The first of these arguments was
grounded in the eighth amendment and the second was based on the
fifth amendment's due process clause.
The eighth amendment states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required ... .,.2 The central controversy was whether the prohibition
of excessive bail in non-capital 53 cases should be interpreted as an
absolute right to release unless the risk of flight was so great that the
defendant's absence was likely to obstruct the further progress of the
trial process, or, on the other hand, whether additional factors could be
considered. Proponents of preventive detention argued54 that courts had
50 Both the New York City and Chicago Bar Associations vehemently opposed the enactment of preventive detention. 116 CONG. Rsc. E1033-36 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1970) and 116
CONG. RiEc. S11600-03 (daily ed. July 16, 1970) (remarks of Senator Ervin).
51 Policy arguments against enacting preventive detention included: (1) the absence of
reliable data on the incidence of crime committed by persons released prior to trial; (2)
the absence of reliable predictive techniques which would allow judges to minimize error
in incarcerating accused defendants before trial; (3) the inability of already overloaded
courts to handle the additional burden of preventive detention hearings, which would
lead eventually to even further delays in criminal trials; (4) the failure to use techniques
which were already available-and constitutional-to restrain defendants before trial, such
as revocation of probation or parole, strict enforcement of pretrial release conditions
(which went largely unenforced because of lack of judicial and administrative manpower),
and closer coordination between jurisdictions to detain persons who were wanted in
jurisdictions other than that in which they were arrested; and (5) detention of defendants
prior to trial was a radical departure from previous practice which ought not be
resorted to until all reasonable alternatives--especially some attempt to achieve speedy
trials through legislative and judicial collaboration-had been tried and had failed.
52 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
53 It was admitted by all sides that the denial of bail in capital cases-which had
existed in Britain at the time the eighth amendment was adopted and which had been
specifically provided for in the Judiciary Act of 1789--did not violate the "excessive bail"
prohibition.
54 About the time the House of Representatives began consideration of the preventive
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always considered the suspect's danger to the community in setting bail
and, as a practical matter, in determining whether he would be released,
since high money bail often had the same result as denying bail al-.
together. They pointed out that at the time the eighth amendment was
drafted, many more crimes carried the death penalty, and thus many
more defendants could be denied bail absolutely, within the terms of
the eighth amendment, than is possible today. Finally, they argued that
no Supreme Court case had ever held specifically that there was an
absolute right to bail in non-capital cases and that some lower courts
had decided to the contrary.
A Justice Department memorandum, 55 made available to the House
Judiciary Committee in late 1969, placed heavy reliance on Carlson v.
Landon,5 6 a civil proceeding which involved detention of aliens prior
to deportation. The case contained language which appeared to support the argument that there was no absolute right to bail:
The contention is ... advanced that the Eighth Amendment
to the Constitution ... compels the allowance of bail in a
reasonable amount .... [T]he cases cited by the applicants...
fail flatly to support this argument. We have found none that
do.
... Indeed, the very language of the Amendment fails to
say all arrests must be bailable. We think, clearly, here that
the Eighth Amendment does not require that bail be allowed
57
under the circumstances of these cases.
The Justice Department memo made only passing reference to, and
did not quote from, another important Supreme Court case, Stack v.
Boyle, 58 which interpreted the reach of the eighth amendment's bail
clause specifically in criminal cases. In Stack bail for defendants
charged under the Smith Act was set at an unusually high amount. The
Court held that the bail was excessive, and included sweeping language
which is as close as the Court has come to elaborating the significance
of the eighth amendment's excessive bail prohibition.
From the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789 . . . to the
present Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 46(a)(1),
detention proposal, a rash of artides and speeches began to appear. See, e.g., J.N. Mitchell,
Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Preventive Detention, 116 CONG. REc. E777-82
(daily ed. Feb. 9, 1970); R.G. Kleindienst, The Case for Pre-trialDetention, Speech of Jan.
30, 1970, to the American Trial Lawyers' Ass'n, Freeport, Grand Bahama Island, 116 CONG.
R c. E858-61 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1970).
55 116 CONG. REc. El3 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1970).
56 342 U.S. 524 (1951).
57 342 U.S. at 544-46.
58 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
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federal law has unequivocally provided that a person arrested
for a non-capital offense shall be admitted to bail. This traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the
infliction of punishment prior to conviction.... Unless this
right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of
innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would
lose its meaning.
The right to release [not to bail, to release] before trial is
conditioned upon the accused's giving adequate assurance
that he will stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty.
...
Bail set at a higher figure than an amount reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose is "excessive" under the
Eighth Amendment.
... To infer from the fact of indictment alone a need for
bail in an unusually high amount is an arbitrary act. Such
conduct would inject into our own system of government the
very principles of totalitarianism which Congress was seeking
to guard against in passing the [Smith Act] under which the
petitioners were indicted.5 9
Although Stack did not completely settle the law under the eighth
amendment, it certainly cut against the arguments of the proponents
of preventive detention. Moreover, two further possible infirmities,
which were given short shrift by the Justice Department memo, remained unanswered: (1) the conflict with traditional conceptions of
the presumption of innocence, and (2) the vagueness of the standards
provided to guide judicial determinations.
Advocates of preventive detention referred fondly to the presumption
of innocence as "a mere rule of evidence," which could not be elevated
into an absolute rule of criminal procedure. This cavalier treatment of
the presumption of innocence, perhaps more than anything else, alerted
opponents of preventive detention to the insensitivity of the leadership
of the Justice Department. Men who could take the principle which
more than any other represents to the average citizen the whole basis
of our criminal justice system and reduce it to a "mere rule of evidence," were capable, it was feared, of still more Draconian action.
A second problem with the preventive detention proposal was the
vagueness of the standard to be applied by a judicial officer in his pretrial detention determination, that is, whether the suspect is "potentially dangerous." This vagueness was apparent during hearings on
preventive detention before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights. Subcommittee Counsel, Larry Baskir, questioned Donald
59 S42 U.S. at 4-6.
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Santarelli, a Justice Department representative who reportedly drafted
the Administration's preventive detention bill, about the precise meaning of "dangerousness."
Mr. Baskir: ... So the danger you are seeking to avoid is not
specifically the danger of the commission of one of the list of
crimes designated by you in your bill.., as dangerous crimes
or the list of crimes designated by you as crimes of violence,
but the likelihood of any crime in the future that they may
possibly commit that a judge feels is dangerous to the community.
Do I rephrase your statement properly?
Mr. Santarelli: I am not sure you do, and I am not sure we
can phrase it definitely at this point. The consideration for the
court is to view the defendant in the totality of his circumstances, to review his record of conduct, to review his character
and attitude and to conclude if from this prior activity and
from information that can be adduced, whether or not he will
engage in a course of conduct that will be dangerous to the
community. That might include offenses not enumerated in
the specified dangerous offense category.
Mr. Baskir: If the judge decided the man was, let's say, a
kleptomaniac and he engaged in petty shoplifting, the judge
could under your bill, detain this person in order to prevent
those subsequent offenses; is that correct?
Mr. Santarelli: Or-you know, the line between petty
larceny and grand larceny is very difficult to tell, and from
the record you don't always know ....
Mr. Baskir: ... Your responses suggest that certain kinds
of activity which a judge might consider dangerous, but you
might not, may involve, let's say, the smoking of marihuana.
The judge might consider that to be dangerous. A judge might
consider obscene photographs of other judges or publication
of scurrilous underground newspapers to be dangerous. A
judge might consider to be dangerous certain things which are
practiced such as political demonstrations, dissenting, violent
or non-violent. He might under this bill consider those activities dangerous and he could make a finding, am I correct, that
this is the kind of danger that he would like to correct under
this bill? Is that a correct interpretation?
Mr. Santarelli: What a judge can do and what he ought to
do.Mr. Baskir: I am only talking about now what he can do.
Mr. Santarelli: Presumably, such evaluation or conclusion
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that those activities are dangerous would not be upheld under
the appellate procedures here .... 60
This exchange leaves one wondering how an appellate court could
review a judge's finding of "dangerousness" if the drafter of the
Administration proposal himself was so uncertain as to exactly what
the term included.
The conclusion to the history of preventive detention in the House
and Senate Judiciary Committees is that the bill never left subcommittee in either house of Congress. Despite numerous attempts through
newspaper articles, speechmaking, and Justice Department cheerleadingG1 to color preventive detention as reasonable and constitutionally
respectable, the bills remained anathema to a majority of the lawyermembers of both Judiciary Committees.
But this was not the end of the story. The Administration, conservative Southern members of the House District of Columbia Committee,
and Senator Joseph Tydings of Maryland had a surprise up their sleeves.
The new strategy, formulated in late 1969 when it became apparent
that preventive detention proposals for all federal courts could not be
dislodged from either the House or Senate Judiciary Committee, was
to include preventive detention in the District of Columbia court
reform bill, S. 2601, which had been passed early in 1969 by the Senate
and was pending in the House District of Columbia Committee. Although preventive detention was not the only tailgating measure
included by the House Committee in an otherwise moderate Senate
court reorganization and criminal procedure reform bill, 62 it was by
far the most controversial. The strategy was to lump together the
obviously desirable features of court reform-including for the first
time an independent District of Columbia court system with plenary
60 Hearings on S. 2601 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted at 116 CONG. REc. S12007 (daily
ed. July 23, 1970).
61 See note 54 supra.
62 In addition to preventive detention, H.R. 16196, as reported to the House District
of Columbia Committee, contained authorization for "no-knock" searches, wiretapping and
electronic surveillance, treatment of juveniles fifteen or older as adults, authority for
juvenile court convictions by "a fair preponderance of the evidence" standard, transfer of
control over the Lorton corrections facility to the Federal Bureau of Prisons, harsh
mandatory sentences for certain crimes and offenders, and payment of the attorney's fees
of a policeman who was successfully sued for wrongful arrest by the plaintiff who was
wrongfully arrested.
In one provision of H.R. 16196 the House District Committee so far overreached itself
that the provision was declared unconstitutional before the bill had cleared the HouseSenate conference. In the case of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), it was held that
conviction of a charge of juvenile delinquency by a standard of proof less than "beyond
a reasonable doubt" violated the due process clause.
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jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters relating to the District
of Columbia-with other, far less appealing and more controversial
63
features.
By placing preventive detention in the District of Columbia omnibus
crime bill, the Administration succeeded where it had failed in the
Judiciary Committees. Since a large portion of the violent crime which
falls under federal jurisdiction occurs in Washington, and since the
District of Columbia was a primary target in the President's law and
order exhortations during the 1968 campaign, an authorization of
preventive detention in the nation's capital would serve in large part
the Administration's purpose. The fact that Congress legislates for the
District of Columbia without the benefit of advice from any elected
members of the House from that city of 800,000 of course made the
task of imposing preventive detention much easier. 64
Although few witnesses appeared before the District of Columbia
Subcommittee considering preventive detention, and despite difficulties
encountered by members of the House in obtaining an opportunity to
testify against it,65 on March 13, 1970, the District of Columbia Committee reported the D.C. crime bill to the House for action. The
Committee's opening statement in its report to the House set the tone
for later floor consideration of the bill.
[This] Committee is not aware of any period in the Capital's
history when crime was so rampant as now, when the police
have been so shackled, when prosecutors because of technicalities, and courts because of unrealistic philosophies, and failure
to go full speed ahead, have contributed to a major breakdown
of law enforcement, and there has been such shocking failure
63 After H.R. 16196 was passed by the House of Representatives, that passage was

vacated, S. 2601 (previously passed by the Senate and related to D.C. court reform) was
taken up, and the provisions of H.R. 16196 as passed by the House were substituted for the
Senate version of S. 2601. This is a standard legislative device to reach the point at which
each house of Congress has passed a bill with the same designation but different provisions.
As it completed House consideration, then, the D.C. Court Reform and Criminal
Procedure Act of 1970 bore the designation S. 2601.
04 It is interesting to note that members of the House, including members of the House
D.C. Committee, who seemed utterly convinced of the value of preventive detention for
the District of Columbia were not loudly advocating it for their own states.
65 The minority views of Congressmen Diggs, Fraser, Adams and Jacobs described the
procedural irregularities which characterized the D.C. Committee's consideration of
preventive detention: "The District of Columbia Committee flagrantly violated the sense
of fairness which normally surrounds the hearing process. No witnesses, with the single
exception of the bill's author, the Department of Justice, were invited, nor appeared, to
testify on the bill. Not a single judge appeared. No member of Congress testified. And no
official from any appropriate District of Columbia or Federal department or agency was
invited." H.R. REP. No. 91-907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 202 (1970) [hereinafter cited as D.C.
Comm. R'olm].
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in large part of the machinery of justice to bring to punishment [sic] admitted murderers, rapists and others guilty of
aggravated assaults and robberies. This is a crime-infested
city; let there be no ignoring that factl6 6
B.

Preventive Detention Before the House and Senate

The House District of Columbia Committee used two pages of its
197-page majority report to reassure the members of the House about
constitutional objections to preventive detention. This lack of emphasis
and the inaccuracy of the Committee's constitutional scholarship foretold the quality of the constitutional debate which would follow on the
House floor. To refute objections based on the eighth amendment, the
Committee relied solely on Carlson v. Landon.67 The Committee
asserted that Carlson was the "only decision discussing the history of
the eighth amendment and its application to the right to bail."68 1Somehow, Stack v. Boyle 9 was lost in the shuffle.
Responding to presumption of innocence arguments against preventive detention, the Committee relied on the "simply a rule of
evidence" argument, and coupled it with the ultimate reductio ad
absurdum: "Indeed, if the presumption of innocence prohibits detention prior to trial, it would even prohibit a policeman from arresting
70
a person he observed robbing a bank with a shotgun."
Rather than addressing directly the problem of vagueness, the majority report handled due process objections by arguing that no court had
ever held detention without bail of a person found likely to flee before
trial to be a violation of due process and that, in any case, the bill included other procedural safeguards. 71
The Committee noted further that one of its two primary objectives
in reporting a bill including preventive detention was "to eliminate
from the bail system the hypocrisy of locking up defendants, without
fixed standards, through the device of requiring high money bond."72
The Committee failed to note that this misuse of money bail, although
widespread, was arguably unconstitutional and specifically prohibited
in the District of Columbia by the 1966 Bail Reform Act. Indeed, the
Committee may in this argument have discovered an entirely new
66 Id. at 3.
67

342 U.S. 524 (1951).

68 D.C. COmm. REPoRT at 91.
69 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
70 D.C. Comf. RapoRT at 92.
71 Id. at 93. Moreover, the failure to discuss the addition of "dangerousness" to the

traditional "risk of flight" standard for the denial of bail avoided the crux of the historical
and constitutional objections to preventive detention.
72 Id. at 82.
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approach to constitutional exegesis: take an arguably unconstitutional
practice (preventive detention by means of high money bail), venerate it
("700 years of legal practice" was how the Committee described the use
of high money bond to detain "dangerous" defendants), and when
Congress prohibits the practice specifically by statute, use its venerable
history as a justification for enacting the unconstitutional practice into
law. Under this "elimination of hypocrisy" rationale, racial discrimination, denial of counsel to indigent defendants, and malapportioned
legislatures may have a great future.
Minority views signed by Congressmen Diggs, Fraser, Adams and
Jacobs restated the eighth amendment and due process objections to
preventive detention and added that the increased difficulty of consulting counsel during pretrial confinement might violate the sixth amend73
ment's guarantee of right to counsel.
On March 19, 1970, the House of Representatives met in a marathon
11-hour session to consider the omnibus D.C. crime bill. Despite the
bill's enormous length and the complexity of many of its provisions,
the House Democratic leadership and leaders of the House District of
Columbia Committee determined that all consideration should be
completed in one day. It is safe to say that no member of the House
other than D.C. Committee members had read the entire bill, and
many had not read even the bill's more controversial provisions. A
number of conscientious members managed to read the 231-page
committee report, although it had been available for only three legislative days prior to House consideration of the bill.
The atmosphere created by the hysterical anti-crime tone of the
Committee's report and the pressure to complete action on the bill in
one day made it almost impossible to debate rationally the merits of the
Committee's bill on either constitutional or policy grounds. At one
point in the debate, pressure to limit remarks became so great that
members of the House were limited to fractions of a minute to comment on pending amendments. 4
At the session's end, only 47 members voted against passage of the
75
bill; 294 voted for and 88 did not vote.
Of course no one really believed, once the D.C. crime bill left committee, that it could be stopped on the floor. Opponents' hopes had
focused instead on the Senate and on a strange coalition of liberals and
Southern strict constructionists brought together by Senator Ervin. The
73 Id. at 198-202.
74 For a summary of the amendments offered to H.R. 16196 and rejected, see 116 CONG.
Rac. D262-63 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1970). The House consideration of the bill is contained
in id. at H1956-2090.
75 Id. at 2089.
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Senate had earlier passed S. 2601, its own version of a D.C. court
reorganization and criminal procedure reform bill, which did not
include preventive detention. But the Senate would now be acting on the
report of House and Senate conferees who met to resolve differences in
the House and Senate versions. Since Senator Joseph Tydings, Chairman
of the Senate District of Columbia Committee, had already indicated
his willingness to accept preventive detention (he had earlier introduced
his own preventive detention bill), it was a foregone conclusion that
the House-Senate conferees would agree on a compromise version
which included preventive detention. What was not known was
whether this compromise would be accepted by the Senate as a whole.
Senate debate, which began on July 15, 1970, lasted for seven legislative days, with an unusual number of Senators rising to state personally
their support for or objections to the compromise bill. The Senate's
prolonged, careful consideration of constitutional implications and the
conscientious speeches of many Senators, stand in marked contrast to
the legislative pattern followed in the House.
Senator Tydings opened consideration with a long statement in favor
of the compromise bill, specifically endorsing the preventive detention
provisions.76 He did not discuss constitutional issues, preferring instead
to emphasize the achievements of the Senate conferees in moderating
the harsh provisions of the House bill.7 7 Senator Hruska, following
Tydings, expressed his support for the measure, citing his scholarly
article on the constitutional and policy issues involved in preventive
detention. 78 Next came the leading opponent, Senator Ervin, inserting
statements of opposition on constitutional grounds from the American
79
Bar Association Section on Individual Rights and Responsibilities
8
0
and the Chicago Bar Association.
On July 17 and 20, the debate continued, largely dominated by
Senator Ervin, but with occasional contributions from other Senators.
116 CONG. REC. S11568-74 (daily ed. July 16, 1970) (remarks of Senator Tydings).
The conference version of the bill did reflect four significant improvements of the
House-passed version of preventive detention. These were: (I) a prohibition against the
detention of any defendant charged with a non-capital crime solely on the basis of the
nature and circumstances of the present alleged offense, (2) the elimination of nonforcible
rape and indecent liberties from the definition of "dangerous crimes," (3) the addition of
a provision that the sixty-day maximum period of preventive detention could not be
extended because of motions filed by the defendant, except motions for continuance, and
(4) a requirement that trials of persons preventively detained be placed on an expedited
trial calendar. H.R. RrP. No. 91-1303, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 239-40 (1970) (statement of
Managers on the Part of the House) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT].
78 See 116 CONe. REc. S11585 (daily ed. July 16, 1970). The article cited by Senator
Hruska appears in 3 CIGrroN L. Rzv. 36 (1969).
79 116 CONG. Rc. S11594-95 (daily ed. July 16, 1970).
80 Id. at S11600-03.
76

77
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On July 20, Senator Dole of Kansas fell into the trap of praising
preventive detention for exposing the hypocrisy of detention through
high-money bail-which was already illegal in the District of Columbia.81 On July 21, Senators Young of Ohio, Muskie of Maine, and
McGovern of South Dakota all criticized the compromise bill, placing
heavy emphasis on the practical-but only rarely on the constitutional
-weaknesses of preventive detention.
On July 22 and 23, the last days on which the Senate debated the
conference report, a strange division between Senators became apparent.
Younger, liberal Senators of both parties spoke against the compromise
D.C. crime bill, and especially against preventive detention, but rarely
relied on detailed constitutional argumentation to support their opposition. In this category were Senators Eagleton, Hart, and Hughes. On
the other hand, more conservative Senators almost invariably made the
constitutional arguments which they felt supported the viability of
preventive detention. Among these Senators were Robert Byrd of West
Virginia, Senator Hollings, and Senator Dole. Among conservative
Senators, only Senator Fannin of Arizona spoke out without buttressing
his statement with constitutional argumentation.
On July 22, an interesting colloquy took place between Senator
Robert Byrd and the much younger Senator William Saxbe of Ohio,
both of whom favored preventive detention. The exchange illustrates
well the widely held congressional attitude about constitutional problems: "Let the Court decide it."
Mr. Saxbe: To what does the distinguished Senator from
West Virginia attribute the seeming reluctance of the opponents of the conference report to submit to the courts the
questions of unconstitutionality of these two specific provisions? I find that their opposition to the conference report
always goes back to the constitutional question, and when one
says, "Well, if it is unconstitutional, we have a court for that
purpose," yet they do not want that. Has that disturbed the
Senator?
Mr. Byrd: I have mixed feelings with regard to this ....
I believe that it is the responsibility of every Senator to attempt to interpret the Constitution as well as his best lights
will allow him to do so, in voting for or against a bill when
the constitutionality thereof may be in question.
I think we, as Senators, have that responsibility. 2
This discussion illustrates what seems in general to be the case: that
81 116 CONG. REc. S11761 (daily ed. July 20, 1970).
82 116 CONG. REc. S11878 (daily ed. July 22, 1970).
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older, often more conservative members of Congress seem to have a
greater sense of obligation to work out to their own satisfaction constitutional problems in the proposals before them than do younger, often
more liberal members.
Finally, on July 23, after a constitutional debate which did great
credit to the Senate as a legislative institutiofl and to many of its
individual members, the Senate approved the conference report on
the D.C. crime bill by a vote of 54 to 33. 3 Those voting against the bill
included a surprising number of Southern or border-state SenatorsAnderson, Cook, Cooper, Fulbright, Jordan and Stennis in addition to
Senator Ervin-who might otherwise have been expected to favor a
tough anti-crime bill for the District of Columbia. Senator Holland of
Florida, who voted for the bill, expressed his misgivings and put his
finger on the explanation for this unexpected Southern opposition.
My respect for the distinguished senior Senator from North
Carolina is such and in particular my recognition of his unexcelled capability in the field of constitutional law is so great that
I was unwilling to vote for said conference report in view of
his deep and expressed conviction as to the unconstitutionality
of several portions of that bill in the absence of a conviction
of my own as to its usefulness and the very great existing need
for many unquestioned [court reform] provisions of the measure.8 4
C.

Congress, Preventive Detention and the Constitution

Several condusions may be drawn from this study of congressional
consideration of preventive detention. First, it would seem that parliamentary procedures in the House of Representatives are far less conducive to thorough consideration of legislation (constitutional or
other) than the procedures of the Senate. Perhaps this is inevitable in
a body more than four times the size of the Senate.
It was also obvious that the House was far more subject to the
artificially created pressures surrounding the D.C. crime bill than was
the Senate. Many members of the House believed-incorrectly in our
opinion-that for political reasons they simply could not vote against
one of the Administration's most publicized anti-crime proposals, no
matter what their constitutional reservations. By contrast, Senators, in
part due to their longer terms of office, appeared to remain much freer
and more independent in weighing political and constitutional considerations.
83 116 CONG. REc.
84 Id.

S12029 (daily ed. July 23, 1970).
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Finally, congressional consideration of preventive detention reinforced the conclusion-reached tentatively during discussion of the
Defense Facilities and Industrial Security Act-that highly charged,
emotional situations make it virtually impossible to bring to bear
convincing constitutional argumentation during the course of legislative debate. It is interesting, in connection with this conclusion, that
the pressures and emotionalism brought to bear on the first bill were
different in nature from those which influenced enactment of the
second. The Defense Facilities bill involved a more traditional form of
"fear" symbolized by the witchhunts of the McCarthy era, while
preventive detention was fostered by a new strain of "fear" on the issues
of law and order. The two pressures originated in different eras, from
different social and historical circumstances, but their impact on the
Congress and the nation was much the same. In yielding to these
pressures, the prevailing view of the Congress was: "If it is unconstitutional, that is what we have a court for."
III.

H.R. 4249,

THE VOTING RIGHTS

Acr OF 1970

AND THE 18-YEAR-OLD VOTE

Our examination of the significance of constitutional debate in the
legislative process has thus far been limited to cases where the Constitution arguably restricted congressional power. But the Constitution
not only restrains national legislative power, it also grants it. During
the 91st Congress some of the most interesting and important constitutional debates involved the proper interpretation of constitutional
grants of legislative power. It would not have been surprising if Congress had assumed a broad interpretation of such constitutional grants,
without questioning their limits. In fact, this turns out not to be the
case. Experience with the question of Congress' power to enfranchise
18-year-old voters and the exercise of its warmaking powers shows the
national legislature to be seriously concerned that the manner in
which grants of power are exercised be consonant with the Constitution.
A.

The Voting Rights Act of 1970

The issue of Congress' power under the Constitution to enfranchise
the nation's 18, 19 and 20-year-olds in local, state and national elections
arose as part of the debate over extending provisions of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.5 That Act, widely and justly hailed as the most
effective civil rights legislation of modem times, was scheduled to
expire on August 7, 1970. Its straightforward, no-nonsense approach to
guaranteeing the voting rights of black voters in seven Southern states
85 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-73p (Supp. V, 1965-69).
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had, in the course of five years, produced enormous results. 8 6 By even
the most conservative estimates, some 800,000 black voters had been
registered in the states covered by the Act in that time. In the three
years between 1964 and 1967, the percentage of the non-white voting
age population registered to vote increased dramatically: in Georgia,
from 27.4 to 52.6; in Alabama, from 19.3 to 51.6; in Mississippi, from
6.7 to 59.8.87 As a direct result of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 540
black citizens had been elected to state and local elective offices in 11
Southern states by the year 1970.
On December 11, 1969, the House of Representatives, caught in the
squeeze between a watered-down Administration voting rights proposal
and the traditional Southern-Democratic and conservative-Republican
coalition, had by the narrowest of margins refused to pass a straight
extension of the 1965 Act as recommended by the House Judiciary
Committee."" Instead, the House passed the Administration's compromise bill and sent it on to the Senate Judiciary Committee, chaired by
Senator James 0. Eastland of Mississippi. In the Senate, however, a
bipartisan coalition of pro-civil rights Senators joined efforts to see that
the Senate Judiciary Committee did not pigeonhole H.R. 4249.
Initially, it extracted from the Judiciary Committee leadership a
commitment to report the Voting Rights Act of 1970 to the Senate
floor no later than March 1, 1970. As this date approached, the same
coalition blocked consideration of the nomination of Judge G. Harrold
Carswell to the Supreme Court as a lever to insure prompt consideration
of the Voting Rights Act.
As effective as the bipartisan civil rights coalition had been in
assuring full Senate consideration of H.R. 4249, virtually no one anticipated-in the early stages of maneuvering on the bill-that it would
ultimately involve the constitutional issue of Congress' power to grant
the 18-year-old vote. By a coincidence of time, Senator Birch Bayh's
Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments was holding
86 The three most important provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 were: (1) a
suspension of literacy tests and other "devices" used to impede voter registration in areas
covered by the Act, (2) an authorization for federal registrars to enter counties covered by
the Act and register voters in place of registration by local officials, and (3) a requirement
that changes in state election laws by states covered by the Act be submitted to the
United States Attorney General for approval and be subject to expedited challenge procedures in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The Act's
coverage formula was that any county was covered in which less than 50% of the voting
age population had been registered to vote in the presidential election of 1964. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973b(b) (Supp. V, 1965-69).
87 116 CoNG. REc. S3191 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1970) (remarks of Senator Bayh).
88 The vote on acceptance of the Administration's watered-down voting rights proposal
over the straight extension of the 1965 Act recommended by the House Judiciary Committee was 208-203. 115 CoNG. REc. H12184 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1969).
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hearings on a proposed constitutional amendment to lower the voting
age to 18 nationwide. During these hearings, both Senator Edward M.
Kennedy and former Solicitor General of the United States Archibald
Cox argued that the job could constitutionally be accomplished simply
by congressional enactment.
When first presented in February, 9 the Kennedy-Cox argument met
with skepticism and downright disbelief. But by mid-March, when the
Voting Rights Extension Act of 1970 was before the Senate, a significant
number of Senators had resolved their doubts and agreed to co-sponsor
the attempt to enact 18-year-old voting by statute. Much of the persuasion involved in this constitutional change of heart went on behind the
scenes and cannot be documented. The slowly spreading conviction of
Congress' power to enact 18-year-old voting by statute, however, provides perhaps the clearest example during the 91st Congress of the
power of a pure constitutional argument. There were, of course, partisan political considerations surrounding consideration of the Voting
Rights Extension Act as a whole. On the substantive issue of whether
18-year-old citizens should have the vote, however, there was virtual
unanimity among Senators, with proponents stretching from Senator
Goldwater to Senator Kennedy. Thus, the issue of Congress' constitutional power to enact 18-year-old voting by statute-as opposed to the
wisdom of such a policy-was presented in almost pristine form.
On March 10, 1970, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield introduced Senate Amendment No. 545 to H.R. 4249. The amendment
added a new Title III to the Voting Rights Act which prohibited states
from discriminating against 18, 19 and 20-year-old citizens by denying
them the right to vote. The new title also provided expedited procedures for a speedy court test of the constitutionality of the prohibition. The congressional prohibition against the 21-year-old voting
requirement was based on a congressional finding that such a requirement violated equal protection and due process of law as to citizens over
18 but under 21 years of age. When introduced, the amendment had
17 co-sponsors.
The constitutional theory behind Mansfield's amendment-the
strength and persuasiveness of which more than any other single factor
carried the day for the amendment-was outlined in a letter from
Harvard Law Professor Paul Freund to Senator Mansfield. The letter
supported in spare but eloquent prose the constitutional argument
urged earlier by Senator Kennedy and Professor Cox.
89 Senator Kennedy's memorandum and testimony appear at 116 CONG. Rc. S3392-96
(daily ed. Mar. 10, 1970). Professor Cox's testimony appears at 116 CONG. Rzc. S3481-83
(daily ed. Mar. 11, 1970).
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The Constitution of 1787 left the question of suffrage
basically to the several states. In Article I, section 2, it is
provided that the electors in each state for the House of
Representatives "shall have the same qualifications requisite
for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature."....
But that original text does not stand alone. The Fourteenth
Amendment, with its guarantee of equal protection of the laws
• . . introduced a vital gloss on the authority of the state,
namely that unreasonable classifications by law are unacceptable. This general standard applies to the laws of suffrage no
less than to other laws ....It is much too late to question this
force of the Fourteenth Amendment in this area. Indeed, the
first of the so-called white primary cases was decided on the
basis of the Fourteenth rather than the Fifteenth .... Smith
v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 658 (1944), referring to Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). The whole line of reapportionment cases rests on the application of the equal protection
guarantee to suffrage; ...

The essential [constitutional] question, then, is whether Congress, in its power and responsibility to enforce the guarantees
of the Fourteenth Amendment, may properly conclude that
exclusion from suffrage of those between 18 and 21 years of
age now constitutes an unreasonable discrimination. That this
is a judgment for the Congress to make is plain from the
original conception of the Fourteenth Amendment and from
recent decisions under it. Section 5 of that Amendment, empowering Congress to enforce its provisions "by appropriate
legislation," was regarded as the cutting edge of the Amendment. It was expected that Congress would supply the substantive content for the deliberately general standards of equal
protection, due process, and privileges and immunities.
Recent decisions have emphasized the propriety, indeed the
responsibility, of Congressional action in the area of voting
rights. In [Katzenbach v. Morgan] the Supreme Court emphasized that the judgment of unreasonable discrimination [of
New York state's English language voting requirement] was
one that Congress had appropriately made for itself, and that
its judgment would be upheld unless it were itself an unreasonable one. Any other view of the court's function, said the
Court, "would deprecate both Congressional resourcefulness
and Congressional responsibility for implementing the
Amendment.... It is enough.., that we perceive a basis upon
which Congress might predicate a judgment that the application of New York's literacy requirement ...

constituted an
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invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause." Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1966).
The question for Congress is essentially the same, whether
the exclusion be on criteria of sex, residence, literacy, or age.
It is not my purpose to review the considerations that have
been brought forward in favor of reducing the voting age.
They involve a judgment whether twenty-one has become an
unreasonable line of demarcation in light of the level of
education attained by younger persons, their involvement in
political discussion, their capacity in many cases to marry,
their criminal responsibility, their obligation for compulsory
military service. Historically, we are told, twenty-one was fixed
as the age of majority because a young man was deemed to
have become capable at that age of bearing the heavy armor
of a knight. 90
During the three days of Senate debate which followed the introduction of Senate Amendment No. 545, additional co-sponsors were
added, bringing the total to within a few Senators of an absolute
majority. Not until the vote was taken, however, on March 12, was it
clear how convincing the supporters of the Mansfield-Kennedy position
had been. The Mansfield amendment passed overwhelmingly, 64-17.91
Adoption of the Mansfield amendment was followed, one day later,
by Senate approval of the Scott-Hart substitute for the House-passed
Administration Voting Rights Extension Act. Essentially, the ScottHart proposal: (1) extended the 1965 Act without change, (2) enlarged
the scope of its authorization to the Attorney General to employ
federal registrars and review changes in state voting laws so that this
authority included some Northern and Western counties as well as
Southern, (3) suspended the use of literacy tests nationwide for five
years, and (4) established nationally uniform residence requirements
and absentee voting procedures in presidential elections. This ScottHart substitute proposal, along with the Mansfield amendment on
18-year-old voting, became known as "the Senate amendments" to
H.R. 4249.
With Senate passage of H.R. 4249, as amended, on March 13, 1970,
the first stage in an historic constitutional debate had ended. It
remained to be seen what attitude the House of Representatives would
take in considering the Senate amendments to H.R. 4249.
90 116 CONG. REc. S3502-03 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1970).
91 116 CoNG. REc. S3585 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1970).
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B. House Consideration of the 18-year-old Vote
The process of constitutional argumentation and debate on the
18-year-old vote question took place in the House, as it had in the
Senate, largely off the floor and informally. This renders precise
documentation difficult, although perhaps personal recollections will
serve to bridge the gaps.
It was up to the House either to "disagree to" the Senate amendments and request a conference to resolve differences, or simply to
accept the Senate amendments. In the latter case, the bill would become
law in the precise form passed by the Senate, with both the Scott-Hart
substitute and the Mansfield amendment in place of the weaker Housepassed version. If the House requested a conference, however, the
Senate conferees were expected to be somewhat cool to the bill in its
entirety; with the lever of the Carswell appointment no longer available, there was fear that a conference could be the end of the entire
bill in the Senate.
The chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Emanuel Celler,
did not favor 18-year-old voting. When Senator Kennedy first proposed
to Chairman Celler the idea of amending the Voting Rights Act to
allow 18-year-old voting, the reaction was extremely negative. The
chairmen felt it was irresponsible to jeopardize this essential legislation
by such a controversial provision. Senator Kennedy and his staff then
set out to persuade Chairman Celler that 18-year-old voting was both
constitutional and passable. Even before the amendment passed the
Senate, Mr. Celler was bombarded with letters, articles and miscellaneous documents supporting constitutionality. Simultaneously, the
House Judiciary Committee was informally polled to show an overwhelming support for the amendment.
The most telling argument, however, for Chairman Celler and
others was the pragmatic one that either 18-year-old voting be accepted
or there might be no Voting Rights Act at all. Chairman Celler was
too firmly and irrevocably committed to a straight extension of the 1965
Voting Rights Act to let that happen. The original 1965 Act was considered by Chairman Celler to be among his highest achievements in a
long career of civil rights advocacy. In order to extend that law, he was
willing to enact the 18-year-old vote provisions of the bill and leave
their validity for final determination by the Court.
The strategy adopted by Mr. Celler was to obtain a special rule from
the House Committee on Rules which would provide for a single vote,
up or down, on accepting the Senate Amendments to H.R. 4249. If the
House as a whole adopted this rule-that is, agreed to consider H.R.

The University of Chzcago Law Review

[Vol. 38:449

4249, as amended, on those terms-all members of the House would
consider the Senate action as a whole, with no opportunity for a separate
vote on any part, including the 18-year-old vote. Since supporters of
lowering the voting age were known to include many Southern Democrats and Republicans who might otherwise have favored the weaker
Administration version of the Voting Rights Act, this strategy was
considered most likely to maximize support from all quarters for the
Senate version of H.R. 4249. It also meant, however, that there would
be no clear vote in the House on the constitutional issue of lowering
the voting age by statute, as there had been in the Senate.
Despite the different parliamentary situation faced by House supporters of the 18-year-old vote, all of the same arguments which had
been used-and used successfully-in the Senate were reasserted in the
House. Indeed, many House members had been watching with fascination as H.R. 4249 changed shape in the Senate.
One similarity between House and Senate consideration of the 18year-old voting issue is particularly relevant to this study. Both houses
attached a very large importance to constitutional scholarship and the
views of legal scholars in determining the outcome of the crucial constitutional issue: the extent of congressional power, under the Constitution, to change state-established age qualifications for voting. The
18-year-old vote issue was probably unique among issues considered by
the 91st Congress in this respect. The Bickelites and the Borkites
jousted daily with the Coxites and the Freundites, and the cloakrooms
resounded with learned discussions about the true impact of the White
Primary Cases.
The importance of constitutional scholarship became so magnified
in the last days before House consideration of the Senate version of H.R.
4249 that the Congressional Record became a veritable battleground of
conflicting letters and opinions from constitutional scholars. As a part
of the Senate's consideration of 18-year-old voting, Professors Freund
and Cox had fired the initial salvos. Response was not long in coming
from the Administration, in the form of an opinion from the Department of Justice stating that the constitutionality of a congressional
lowering of the voting age was "uncertain and dubious."9 2 This was
followed by a weighty packet of letters from constitutional law experts
throughout the country discounting the possibility that 18-year-old
3
voting by congressional statute was constitutionally supportable.
92 116 CoNG. REc. S83418 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1970). For the Department of Justice's
entire position on the question of 18-year-old voting, see id. at 3417-19.
93 These letters were later inserted in the Congressional Record by Representative
Clark MacGregor at 116 CoNG. REc. H15647-63 (daily ed. June 17, 1970). Letters were
received from Professors William B. Lockhart, University of Minnesota; Charles Allan
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In.response to these letters, Senator Kennedy, whose office remained
deeply involved in helping to secure House acceptance of the Senate
amendments, placed in the Congressional Record a large collection of
letters from constitutional law experts affirming the constitutionality of
congressional action to lower the voting age.94 The "letters to the
editor" pages of the New York Times, the Washington Post, and such
political journals as the New Republic became battlegrounds on which
the constitutional struggle over H.R. 4249 raged.
One of the earliest and most influential expressions of opposition to
the Kennedy-Cox-Freund line of reasoning came from five faculty
members at Yale Law School.9 5 In what came to be called the Bickel
letter, the five Yale professors relied on three constitutional provisions
in arguing against the validity of proposed congressional action to lower
the voting age. First, of course, was the basic allocation of control over
voter qualifications to the states in article I, section 2. As proof that
the fourteenth amendment had not substantially altered this initial
grant of power, the Bickel letter argued that granting of women's
suffrage had "required" a constitutional amendment just as changing
the method of electing United States Senators had "required" a
comparable amendment. The Bickel letter also placed great weight on
the use of 21 years of age as the presumptive age of voting eligibility in
section 2 of the fourteenth amendment." Finally, the Bickel position
held that the heavy reliance placed by Kennedy-Cox-Freund on the
Katzenbach v. Morgan case was unjustified. It saw that case as making
sense only in the long fourteenth amendment tradition of restraining
state legislation that discriminates against ethnic minorities, but not
Wright, University of Texas; Philip B. Kurland, University of Chicago; Alexander M.
Bickel, Robert H. Bork, Jan G. Deutsch, Louis H. Pollak, and Eugene V. Rostow, Yale
Law School; Gerald Gunther, Stanford University; Gerhard Casper, University of Chicago;
Herbert Wechsler, Columbia University; Louis Nenkin, Columbia University; Ernest J.
Brown, University of Pennsylvania; Robert G. Dixon, George Washington University; and
Paul G. Kauper, University of Michigan.
94 116 CoNe. R.Ec. S7277-85 (daily ed. May 18, 1970). Letters were received from Professors Melville B. Nimmer, University of California; Jon M. Van Dyke, The Center for the
Study of Democratic Institutions; Peter J. Donnici, University of San Francisco; David J.
Reber, Arthur Earl Bonfield, University of Iowa; Lawrence R. Velvel, University of
Kansas; Arthur E. Sutherland, Andrew L. Kaufman, Law School of Harvard University;
John D. O'Reilly, Jr., Boston College of Law; Albert J. Rosenthal, Columbia University;
Frank R. Strong, University of North Carolina; Frederic S. Gray, Chase Law School;
Raul Serrano-Geyles, University of Puerto Rico; Martin A. Frey, Texas Tech University;
William F. Swindler, College of William and Mary; Abner Brodie, University of Wisconsin;
Christopher D. Stone, University of Southern California; Paul Bender, University of
Pennsylvania.
95 Reprinted at 116 CONG. Rac. H5648 (daily ed. June 17, 1970).
90 Hearings Before Subcomm. on ConstitutionalAmendments of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 249 (1970) (testimony of Dean Louis Pollak).
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as a basis for validating congressional action affecting eleven million
young Americans of all racial and ethnic origins.
On June 17, the House met to consider the Senate amendment to
H.R. 4249. The initial issue to be decided was whether the House
would accept the Rules Committee recommendation that the Senate
amendments be voted up or down as a package, with no separate votes
on individual amendments. If the recommendation prevailed, it was
virtually certain that the entire package-extension of the 1965 Voting
Rights Act, new nationwide bans on literacy tests and residence requirements over thirty days for presidential elections, and 18-year-old voting
-would pass the House. By House rules, unfortunately, debate on the
recommended rule was limited to one hour.
Although some procedural and partisan political commentary did
creep into the debate, the one hour of debate was almost pure constitutional argument. That one hour was as close as the House of Representatives ever came during the 91st Congress to sustained, scholarly, careful
debate directed solely at a difficult and important constitutional issue.
Much of the debate on the House floor summarized the arguments
which had been made in private among House members in the several
weeks preceding June 17. That argument had taken on a mildly partisan-as opposed to scholarly-cast with the dispatch of President
Nixon's letter to House Minority Leader Gerald Ford. 7 In his letter,
the President stated that although he favored both extension of the 1965
Voting Rights Act (a change from his earlier proposal to weaken it) and
18-year-old voting, he did not believe that the latter change could be
accomplished constitutionally by statute. He therefore recommended
that the Senate amendments to H.R. 4249 be disagreed to by the House
and the differences between House and Senate versions of the bill be
worked out in conference. Since Senate Judiciary Committee members,
the most senior of whom were Southern and very conservative, were the
most likely Senate conferees, proponents of the lowered voting age
viewed the President's recommendations as a potentially disastrous
course for the House to follow.
The President's letter was important not so much because of the
force of its constitutional arguments, but because it put in the hands of
those favoring a House-Senate conference the implied threat from the
President that he might veto H.R. 4249 if passed by Congress in the
Senate form. The letter drew quick rebuttals from both Democrats and
Republicans who upheld the constitutionality of statutory enfranchisement of 18-year-olds and disputed the President's recommended
97

116 CoNG.

REC.

H3610-11 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1970).
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action. 98 These same arguments were repeated during the one hour
of debate on June 17.
The debate on enfranchisement of 18-year-olds developed around
three general positions. The first affirmed without question both the
constitutionality of enacting 18-year-old voting by statute and the
wisdom of such a congressional policy determination. The second held
that unquestionably Congress was without constitutional power to
lower the voting age by statute. 9 The third position frankly admitted
uncertainty on the constitutional issue, but recognized the desirability
of enfranchising 18-year-olds and was willing to "let the court decide
it." Typical of this point of view was Representative Matsunaga's statement:
As in any other questions of constitutionality, sincere and
well-intentioned minds can and will differ on this issue. The
Supreme Court is duly designated by the Constitution as the
final arbiter on questions of constitutionality. Let us, therefore, carry out our responsibilities as Members of Congress
and legislate as we deem proper and let the Court decide
whether or not we acted beyond our constitutional authority.
Let us do now what we think is right. 0 0
At the end of one hour's debate, the House adopted the Rules Committee recommended rule by a vote of 224-183, thus assuring simultaneous consideration of all Senate amendments to H.R. 4249. The
ensuing vote to accept those amendments in toto was more substantial,
272-132.101

C.

Congress and the 18-year-old Vote
Of all the constitutional issues considered by the 91st Congress, the
question of Congress' power to enfranchise the nation's 18, 19 and 20year-old citizens was by all odds the most thoroughly and carefully
considered. The quality of debate in both the House and Senate was
high. Both sides made use of expert opinions of constitutional scholars.
Since there was very little expressed disagreement on the nonconstitutional merits of the 18-year-old voting issue, most discussion and
controversy centered on the question of Congress' constitutional power
to make the change.
98 See, e.g., 116 CONc. REc. H3672-73 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1970).
99 Even Chairman Celler adhered to this unequivocal view about the unconstitutionality
of the 18-year-old voting proposal. As indicated earlier, however, he had overpowering
reasons for supporting the rule anyway. 116 CONG. Rc. H5641-42 (daily ed. June 17, 1970).
100 Id. at H5640 (remarks of Representative Matsunaga).
101 Id. at H5679.
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In light of the Court's ultimate resolution of this question, 1 2 it is
interesting to note that at no time during congressional consideration
of the 18-year-old vote issue was the possibility raised that there was
greater power to affect voter qualifications for elections to national
offices than for elections to state and local offices. Since neither the
Constitution nor the proposed statute differentiated voter qualifications
by the offices to which candidates were being elected, the distinction
simply never occurred to any of those engaged in the debate. Indeed, in
view of the Constitution's express linking of voter qualifications for
state and national elections and the absence of any previous Supreme
Court decision turning on such a distinction, it can safely be said that
the Court's ultimate resolution of the problem was almost wholly
103
unanticipated by scholars and legislators alike.
The full, fair and enlightened nature of the constitutional debate on
18-year-old voting in both the House and Senate can be attributed to at
least three factors. The first factor was the relative absence of disagreement on the policy-as opposed to the constitutional-merits of the
issue. This produced a much less heated and emotional atmosphere
than was present in the considerations of preventive detention and the
Defense Facility Act. Second, debate in both the House and Senate was
under the control of men who were willing to allow the full merits of the
issue to be debated. This openness promoted a feeling of fairness and
decorum on both sides of the constitutional argument. Finally, in the
case of 18-year-old voting, Congress was considering not a constitutionally imposed and court enforced restraint on its power, but the
dimensions of a constitutional grant of power. This factor seems to have
produced a greater feeling of congressional responsibility and selfrestraint. It was almost as if Congress could accept more gracefully and
deal more maturely with self-imposed restraints on the exercise of its
power than with restraints imposed or enforced by a coordinate branch
of government.
In sum, the debate over the constitutional permissibility of reducing
the voting age by congressional enactment seemed to bring out the
best in both the House and Senate. It was almost as if the Court's charge
in Katzenbach v. Morgan-"itwas for Congress... to assess and weigh
United States v. Arizona, 91 S.Ct. 260 (1970).
103 The Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Arizona itself is evidence of an
unusual divergence of opinion. Four Justices (White, Brennan, Douglas and Marshall) voted
to uphold the constitutionality of Title III of H.R. 4249 in its entirety; four Justices
(Burger, Harlan, Stewart and Blackmun) voted to void Title III in its entirety. Thus the
opinion of Justice Black became the crucial swing vote. It was Justice Black alone who
adhered to the distinction between elections for national offices and elections for state and
local offices. Id. at 4027-33.
102
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the various conflicting considerations.... It is not for us to review the
congressional resolution of these factors.... ."104-had put Congress on
its best constitutional behavior.
IV.

CONGRESS AS WARMAKER vs. THE PRESIDENT AS COMMANDERIN-CHIEF: THE COOPER-CHURCH AMENDMENT

No constitutional issue debated by Congress in recent decades holds

greater significance for the future of this nation than the question of the
respective powers of Congress and the President to commit us to foreign
wars. Within the last five years the most searching re-evaluation of
congressional versus presidential warmaking powers has come from the
United States Senate, and within that body from the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. The Cooper-Church amendment to H.R. 15628,
the Foreign Military Sales Act, was the culmination of a long series of
Foreign Relations Committee activities dealing with the important
imbalance it believed had developed since 1945 between congressional
and presidential responsibilities in foreign affairs generally, but most
specifically in the area of national commitments to employ armed force
abroad.
On March 24, 1970, the House of Representatives passed H.R.
15628, a bill to amend the Foreign Military Sales Act. As passed by the
House, the bill simply updated the existing authorization to finance
credit sales of military equipment and services by the United States to
allied foreign countries. 0 5 Between the time H.R. 15628 passed the
House and May 12, 1970, when it was reported for Senate action by the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a nation-shaking event had occurred: the entrance of American ground combat troops into Cambodia.
The conjunction of the incursion into Cambodia and the shocking
May 4 slaying of four students at Kent State University evoked widespread anger, revulsion and fear, grounded in a sense of helplessness.
The Cambodian venture looked to many like a repeat of our earlier
mistakes in Vietnam. And once again a decision had been made which
seemed to alter American foreign policy significantly, and it had been
made without the advice or knowledge of either the public or the public's representatives in Congress. Large numbers of amateur lobbyists
descended upon Washington to impress their concern upon the insulated, surreal world of Capitol Hill. Significantly, many realized that
it was unwise to try anew to convert supporters of an expanded war
effort into opponents of the President's move into Cambodia. Thus,
tactics as well as heartfelt concern over the proper extent of Executive
104 884 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1966).
105 H.R. Rzp. No. 91-869, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3

(1970).
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Power dictated that the focal point of discussion be the constitutional
question of the war powers of the President and the proper role of the
Congress in formulating and controlling foreign policy.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee provided the vehicle for
this discussion. Because the Committee believed that foreign policy and
military commitment of such consequence ought not to be made by the
President alone, and because it was unhappy with the Administration's
failure to consult or even to advise Congress in advance of its invasion
plans, 106 the Committee added an amendment to the House-approved
what eventually
Foreign Military Sales Act. This amendment contained
10 7
came to be called the Cooper-Church amendment.
The Cooper-Church amendment did not go as far as some Senators
wished-it did not address itself to the question of ending American
involvement in Southeast Asia. Instead, it dealt only with the length of
time United States forces could remain in Cambodia and the type of
military assistance that could be provided after the withdrawal of
American ground troops. 08 But these specific questions reflected con1o6 Secretary of State William P. Rogers had met personally in executive session with
the Foreign Relations Committee twice in the month of April, the last time on April 27,
three days before the Cambodian invasion, and had assured the Committee that it "would
be consulted to the fullest extent possible concerning the [Cambodian] situation." S. REP.
No. 91-865, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1970) [hereinafter cited as FOREIGN RELATIONS Comm.
REPORT]. On the date of the invasion the Committee had sent a detailed letter to Secretary
Rogers requesting information on the precise nature and extent of the United States
invasion and the Administration's plans for the future. Two weeks later, the Committee
had received no reply. Id. at 4-5.
107 The Cooper-Church amendment was approved by the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee before that Committee reported H.R. 15628 to the Senate. Although a number
of amendments to Cooper-Church were adopted on the Senate floor, including a substantial
modification of its preamble, the operative sections of the original amendment remained
intact. As it emerged from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Cooper-Church
amendment read as follows:
Sec. 47. Prohibition of assistance to Cambodia.-In order to avoid involvement
of the United States in a wider war in Indochina and to expedite the withdrawal
of American forces from Vietnam, it is hereby provided that, unless specifically
authorized by law hereafter enacted, no funds authorized or appropriated pursuant
to this Act or any other law may be expended for the purpose of(1) retaining United States forces in Cambodia;
(2) paying the compensation or allowance of, or otherwise supporting, directly
or indirectly, any United States personnel in Cambodia who furnish military
instruction to Cambodian forces or engage in any combat activity in support of
Cambodian forces;
(3) entering into or carrying out any contract or agreement to provide military
instruction in Cambodia or to provide persons to engage in any combat activity
in support of Cambodian forces; or

(4) conducting any combat activity in the air above Cambodia in support of
Cambodian forces.
FOREIGN RLATioNS Comm. R.EPoRT at 15.
108 In
the Foreign Relations Committee, the amendment had been known as the
Cooper-Church-Mansfield-Aiken amendment. The usual procedure for amendments adopted

by the committee of jurisdiction is that they are later adopted by the full Senate by
unanimous consent. Obviously, the regular procedure could not be followed with an
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cern about two far more important and fundamental issues: the extent
to which Congress would allow the President continued independence
in formulating national security policy, and whether effective congressional limitations on that independence could be enforced. These
were the two most important constitutional questions faced by the 91st
Congress.
The amendment relied on a combination of two congressional powers
over warmaking, the war powers of article I, section 8,109 and the socalled power of the purse."10 Although the warmaking power is an explicit grant of congressional authority, it was ultimately the power of
the purse on which Cooper-Church relied. This explained the amendment's basic proscription: ". . no funds authorized or appropriated
pursuant to this Act or any other law may be expended for the purpose
of . . ."il

A. Senate Floor Consideration of Cooper-Church
In his opening speech on the amended H.R. 15628, Senator Fulbright
noted that the Cooper-Church amendment itself was only the latest in
a series of Foreign Relations Committee efforts aimed at restoring some
balance to the respective foreign policy roles of the President and
Congress. Chairman Fulbright pointed to the National Commitments
Resolution, passed by the Senate in mid-1969.1 1 2 Although only a "sense
of the Senate resolution," it had clearly put the Administration on
notice that the Senate intended to assert its proper constitutional responsibilities as a coordinate branch of government, especially in the
case of national commitments leading to use of American military forces
abroad." 3
Senator Fulbright noted' that in light of the Cambodian incursion it
was necessary to reassert some of the principal points which had been
made at the time the national commitments resolution was adopted:
Our country has come far toward the concentration in its
national executive of unchecked power over foreign relations,
particularly over the disposition and use of the Armed Forces
.... The notion that the authority to commit the United
States to war is an Executive prerogative, or even a divided or
uncertain one, is one which has grown up only in recent
amendment as controversial as the Cooper-Church-Mansfield-Aiken amendment. Thus,
Senators Cooper and Church were forced to offer the amendment again on the floor.
109 U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-15.
110 Id. art. I, § 9, cl.
7.
ill For text of Cooper-Church amendment, see note 107 supra.
112 S. Res. 85, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., was considered by the Senate at 115 CONc. RMc
17214-46 (1969), and passed by an overwhelming 70-16. Id. at 17245.
113 116 CoNe. REc. S7106 (daily ed. May 13, 1970) (remarks of Senator Fulbright).
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decades. It is the result primarily of a series of emergencies or
alleged emergencies which have enhanced Executive power,
fostered attitudes of urgency and anxiety, and given rise to a
general disregard for constitutional procedure.'1 4
The report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which accompanied the national commitments resolution traced the history of
executive-congressional authority over foreign military policy. This
report stressed the intent of the framers of the Constitution. In a letter
to Madison in 1789, Thomas Jefferson expressed the common understanding:
We have already given in example one effectual check to the
Dog of war by transferring the power of letting him loose from
the Executive to the Legislative body, from those who are to
spend to those who are to pay."15
In The FederalistNo. 69, Alexander Hamilton, a strong advocate of
executive power, had written:
The President is to be commander in chief of the army and
navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would
be nominally the same as that of the King of Great Britain,
but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to
nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the
military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the
Confederacy, while that of the British king extends to the
declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and
armies-all of which, by the Constitution under consideration,
would appertain to the legislature." 6
Against this history of intended restraint on untrammeled executive
warmaking power, the Administration had put the Senate on notice
that it took a wholly different view of the President's power. In a letter
to Chairman Fulbright, the Department of State asserted:
As Commander in Chief, the President has the sole authority to command our Armed Forces, whether they are within or
outside the United States. And, although reasonable men may
differ as to the circumstances in which he should do so, the
President has the constitutional power to send U.S. military
7
forces abroad without specific congressional approval."1
Senator Fulbright concluded his presentation in support of the
114 Id.
115

Id.

116 Id.
117 Id.
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Cooper-Church amendment by placing the Cambodian invasion in the
context of the continuing debate over executive versus legislative warmaking powers.
It is noteworthy that, in his address to the Nation of April 30
explaining his decision to send American troops to Cambodia,
the President did not think it necessary to explain what he believed to be the legal ground on which he was acting, other
than to refer to his powers as Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces. Equally noteworthy was the President's repeated assertion in his press conference of May 8 that he-and
he alone-as Commander in Chief was responsible for the conduct of the war and the safety of our troops. This sweeping
assertion of the President's authority as Commander in Chief
amounts to the repudiation of those provisions of Article I,
section 8 of the Constitution which empower Congress not
only to "declare war" but to "raise and support armies,"
"provide and maintain a Navy," and "make rules for the
Government and regulation of the land and naval forces." It
is true, of course, that the present administration's attitude in
this area hardly differs from that of its predecessors-except
that preceding administrations took no special pride, as the
present administration does, in adherence to a "strict construction" of the Constitution. 18
Senator Fulbright's presentation set the tone which was to be maintained by later supporters of the Cooper-Church amendment. Often
they dealt with matters of history, matters of policy, or the refutation
of opponents' arguments. But almost without exception they returned
in the end to the bedrock argument that the Cambodian invasion was
the culmination of a series of unconstitutional usurpations of congressional authority by the executive, and that the Cooper-Church
amendment was a decisive and effective way to restore the balance.
Opponents of Cooper-Church, who eventually were to drag the debate
on until the self-imposed June 30 deadline which the President had set
for withdrawal of American ground forces from Cambodia, relied on
a number of arguments, most of them non-constitutional and non-legal
in nature."10 But there were in addition several constitutional arguments
118 Id.

119 The most common of the non-legal arguments were: (1) that whatever Congress'
constitutional prerogatives, it was not wise policy to "tie the President's hands" when
American forces were engaged in a shooting conflict abroad; (2) that although both the
President and Congress might have constitutional responsibilities to protect troops in
combat, only the President had sufficient "intelligence," meaning information, to accomplish this task, and therefore Congress must defer to him on decisions such as the
invasion of Cambodia; (3) that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Act of Aug. 10, 1964, 78
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relied upon, none of which went as far as the State Department's bald
assertion that regardless of surrounding circumstances, the President
could commit United States military forces to combat abroad without
12 0
so much as a nod to Congress.
The simplest argument urged by opponents of Cooper-Church was
that the framers had intended the President to have the power to repel
armed invasions of United States territory. 121 This proposition was close
to undisputed by supporters of the amendment. The problem was that
it did not go to the essence of the Cooper-Church limitation, a ban on
the retention or redeployment of American forces in Cambodia.
A second constitutional argument was more substantive, but no more
responsive to the gravamen of Cooper-Church. This was the proposition,
already accepted by many constitutional and international law experts,
that although some congressional assent was necessary to take the nation
to war, that assent need not be a formal declaration of war.12 2 This
argument interpreted Congress' power to "declare war" as a non-exclusive method of assenting to armed conflict abroad, and included
such other congressional actions as a joint resolution (for example; the
Gulf of Tonkin resolution)1 23 or a mere appropriation of funds to
support an armed conflict entered by order of the President. 124 Although
this second argument was well supported by constitutional theory and
historical practice, it-like the repulsion of armed invasions argument
-did not go to the heart of Cooper-Church. It dealt with the initiation
of hostilities, not with their termination and prevention.
Stat. 384, had authorized the Cambodian invasion and would support any further such

action by the President (the Administration later repudiated this argument because it
maintained that the President had ample authority to carry out the invasion under his
constitutional powers as "Commander-in-Chief'); and (4) that there was ample historical
precedent of presidential wars.
120 See text at note 117 supra.
121 For an admirable scholarly essay which reaches this conclusion, see R. Scigliano,
The President and the War Power: The Intent of the Framers,reprinted at 116 CONG. Rac.
S8795-98 (daily ed. June 10, 1970). There is virtually no dispute among legal and historical
scholars that the Constitution drafters intended the President to have the power to repel
attacks on the territory of the United States without seeking a declaration of war from
Congress.
122 Indeed, the national commitments resolution, supra note 112, had itself said that a
national commitment, including one involving the use of military force, could be
supported by "a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress .
123 See note 119 supra, item (4).
124 The Senate had attempted to exercise its control over the appropriations process by
adding to the Defense Department appropriations bill for fiscal year 1970 a prohibition on
the expenditure of any appropriated funds for the introduction of American ground troops
into Laos or Thailand. At that time, the Kingdom of Cambodia was still under the
apparently firm control of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, and the possibility of introduction
of United States forces into Cambodia was not foreseen. See 116 CoNG. Rac. S7106 (daily
ed. Mar. 13, 1970) (remarks of Senator Church).
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Other constitutional arguments by Cooper-Church opponents were
more tenable and more to the point. One incorporated in the second
Byrd amendment stated that the President's powers as "Commander in
Chief" included authority to "protect American forces wherever deployed." 125 This position was closely related to the argument that
crossing an international frontier had no consequence-in either international law or constitutional doctrine-if the foreign territory invaded
was controlled by some enemy other than the putative sovereign of
that foreign country. This argument considered Cambodia just an
extension of Viet Cong territory in South Vietnam. 2 6 These propositions did go to the heart of Cooper-Church's ban on future involvement
of United States military forces in Cambodia, and were thus hotly
debated. In the end, Senators Cooper and Church accepted the Byrd
position that their amendment did not restrict the President's power
to protect American forces deployed in South Vietnam when they were
in imminent danger, even if that danger threatened from Cambodia.
Since "protection of American forces" was precisely the rationale used
by the President to justify the April 30 Cambodia invasion, many felt
that acceptance of Senator Byrd's limitation "gutted" the entire
Cooper-Church effort?- 7
Much of the seven weeks which the Senate spent debating the
Cooper-Church amendment was devoted to constitutionally inconse125 The second Byrd amendment, also called the Byrd-Griffin amendment, would have
added a proviso to Cooper-Church: "Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to
impugn the constitutional power of the President as Commander in Chief, including the
exercise of that constitutionalpower which may be necessary to protect the lives of United
States armed forces wherever deployed." 116 CONG. RBc. S9313 (daily ed. June 18, 1970).

On the question of allowing the President to use armed forces when he shall deem it
"necessary" for some purpose, Senator Church cited a well-known rebuttal of Abraham
Lincoln made in reference to the United States invasion of Mexico while he was serving in
the House of Representatives:
Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation whenever he shall deem it
necessary to repel an invasion, and you allow him to do so, whenever he may
choose to say he deems it necessary for such purpose-and you allow him to make
war at pleasure. study to see if you can fix any limit to his power in this respect,
after you have given him so much as you propose.
The provision of the Constitution giving the warmaking power to Congress,
was dictated, as I understand it, by the following reasons. Kings had always
been involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if
not always, that the good of the people was the object. This, our Convention
understood to be the most oppressive of all Kingly oppressions; and they resolved

to so frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the power of bringing
upon us.
this oppression
116 CONG. Rxc. S7186 (daily ed. May 14, 1970) (remarks of Senator Church) (emphasis in
the original). Lincoln's remarks were made in a letter to W.H. Herndon, Feb. 15, 1848.
126 See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. S7243-44 (daily ed. May 15, 1970) (remarks of Senator Stennis)
and 116 CoNG. Rkc. S7461 (daily ed. May 19, 1970) (remarks of Senator Miller).
127 The four specific restrictions on the expenditure of appropriated funds to support
United States operations involving Cambodia, supra note 107, retained their substantive

force after adoption of the second Byrd amendment.
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quential amendments. Although both sides agreed that nothing contained in Cooper-Church, or any congressional statute for that matter,
could detract from the President's constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief, opponents of Cooper-Church continually accused its
supporters of attempting to do exactly that. To counter this charge,
Senator Mansfield, himself one of the original co-sponsors of CooperChurch within the Foreign Relations Committee, offered an amendment stating that "[n]othing contained in this section shall be deemed
to impugn the constitutional power of the President as Commanderin-Chief."'1 8 It was adopted unanimously, probably because its vagueness suited the Senate's weariness with the whole subject after an entire
month's debate on Cooper-Church. The Mansfield amendment was
followed a few days later by the Javits amendment, which allowed
Cooper-Church supporters to save face. It read: "Nothing contained in
this section shall be deemed to impugn the Constitutional powers of
the Congress including the power to declare war and to make rules for
the government and regulation of the Armed Forces of the United
29
States."1
Cooper-Church opponents continually engaged in long recitations of
past wars and armed conflicts in which Congress had not played the
constitutional role envisioned by supporters of the amendment. Past
practice is always of some value in interpreting the proper meaningor at least the common understanding at any given period-of uncertain
constitutional provisions. But the most sensible answer to these past
congressional failures to assert its constitutional prerogatives was
offered by University of Chicago law professor Philip B. Kurland in a
debate with Professor Morton A. Kaplan, professor of political science,
also at the University of Chicago.
I would not mean to controvert the proposition that many
Presidents in the past have engaged in what I would consider
unconstitutional wars.
I do not think this practice legalizes it. Because a large numdoes not mean that murder has
ber of murders have occurred
80
suddenly become legal.'
Throughout the grueling seven-week debate on Cooper-Church,
both sides made extensive use of scholarly opinion on the subject of
presidential versus congressional warmaking powers. Some of these
papers were produced by law teachers and students, 13 others by political
128
129
180
131

116 CONG. REc. S8816-30 (daily ed. June 11, 1970).
116 CONG. Rc. S9994 (daily ed. June 26, 1970).
116 CONG. Rc. S9014-15 (daily ed. June 15, 1970).
See, e.g., papers from the Columbia Journal of Transitional Law, 116 CONG. RE
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science and international relations experts.132 It is, of course, impossible
to determine precisely what effects these learned treatises had on individual members, but without question, Senators debating CooperChurch had the benefit of the best scholarly thinking available on the
complex issues involved.
Finally, on June 30, 1970, the day on which United States forces were
scheduled to evacuate completely the areas of Cambodia into which
they had moved, opponents of Cooper-Church allowed the amendment
to come to a vote. It passed, as modified, 13 by a substantial 58-37.134 On
the same afternoon, the Foreign Military Sales Act, with Cooper-Church
included, passed the Senate by a vote of 75-20.135
B. House Consideration of Cooper-Church
There is no more discouraging chapter in the annals of the 91st Congress than the handling by House leaders, including leaders of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, of the Cooper-Church amendment.
In contrast to the seven weeks of exhaustive Senate debate on the constitutional and policy issues underlying Cooper-Church, the House of
Representatives was allowed not a single minute of real debate on the
amendment. In light of the widespread national interest in the issues
involved, and, even more importantly, in light of the total absence of a
clear House vote at any time since the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
on the issue of containing American involvement in Indochina, the
attitude of House leaders was incomprehensible. The lack of a clear
record vote on House support for the war made possible what was
cynically referred to among House members as the "hawk-on-the-floordove-on-the-hustings" syndrome. Those who practiced this brand of
politics would invariably support the war on every non-record vote
taken by the House but when campaigning at home would loudly decry
the nation's continued expenditure of blood and treasure in Southeast
Asia. When H.R. 15628 came back from the Senate, the syndrome
prevailed, but not without some second thoughts by House leaders and
E4571 (daily ed. May 21, 1970); Indochina: The Constitutional Crisis (pts. 1-2), by faculty
and students of Yale Law School, 116 CONG. Rec. S7117 (daily ed. May 13, 1970), and 116
CONG. REc. S7528 (daily ed. May 21, 1970); Invasion Violates InternationalLaw, by students
at New York University Law School, 116 CoNG. REG. E4943 (daily ed. June 1, 1970).
132 See, e.g., Symposium on the Constitutional Issues in the Indochina War, 116 CONG.
REC. 7966-75 (daily ed. May 28, 1970); and note 121 supra.
133 For a summary of the successful amendments to the Cooper-Church proposalaccompanied by some partisan commentary on the significance of each-see 116 CONG. REC.
S10269 (daily ed. June 30, 1970) (remarks of Senator Dole).
'34 Id. at S10275.
135 Id. at S10285.
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not without some lasting effects on the continued practice of legislative
136
secrecy by the House of Representatives.
On July 9, eight days after the Senate passed H.R. 15628 with the
Cooper-Church amendment, Congressman Thomas Morgan, Chairman
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, asked unanimous consent to
take the Senate-passed bill from the Speaker's table, disagree to the
Senate amendments, and go to conference with the Senate. There
were objections to the unanimous consent request, whereupon the
Chairman made his proposal in the form of a motion. At this point,
one hour of debate would normally have been in order. It had been
well publicized before House debate began on the Senate amendments
to the Foreign Military Sales Act that an attempt would be made to
instruct House conferees to accept the Cooper-Church amendment.
Although no one believed that the motion to instruct would pass, it
would nevertheless provide a clear record of House sentiment-and of
the positions of individual House members--on the question of the
Cambodia invasion and future United States involvement in Cambodia.
It would also provide the only possible opportunity for expression of
House sentiment on the constitutional questions considered at such
length by the Senate.
Instead of allowing the one hour of debate on his motion to "disagree to" the Senate amendments to H.R. 15628, Chairman Morgan
moved immediately to cut off all debate-including any motion to
instruct conferees-and to require an immediate vote on going to
conference. Chairman Morgan's rather disingenuous explanation was:
"I have no desire to use any time and there has been no request for
any time, and in an effort to move the legislation along, I will move the
previous question."'137 After Chairman Morgan's move to cut off all
debate had passed by 247-143, he was prevailed upon to ask unanimous
consent to allow debate notwithstanding the passage of the previous
question. This opened the way-not through regular parliamentary
procedures but because of the intercession of House Democratic leaders
136 In the late summer the House of Representatives finally passed, after months of
debate, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1140.
One of the key features of the Act is a change in House parliamentary procedures which
will allow record votes on important substantive issues which are considered separately
from the question of a final passage of the bill. Id. § 120. This provision should go a long
way toward eliminating the secrecy which presently attends House consideration of
controversial public issues. A good deal of the support of this anti-secrecy provision was
generated by the visits of young people and college students and faculty to individual
Congressmen and Senators during debate on the Cooper-Church amendment.
137 116 CONe. Rc. H6513 (daily ed. July 9, 1970). Although a number of speeches
appear in the Congressional Record after Chairman Morgan's motion for previous question,
these were not actually spoken on the floor, but were inserted after the debate by Members
who wished to be on the record on the Cooper-Church issue.
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concerned with the institution's public image-for a motion to instruct
House conferees to accept the Cooper-Church amendment. This motion
was offered by Congressman Donald Riegle, a first-term Republican
member from Michigan. Although another hour's debate was in order
on the motion to instruct conferees, the leadership of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee once again moved to cut off all debate, this
time by a motion to table Riegle's motion to instruct. The net effect
of Chairman Morgan's decisions to allow the motion to instruct to be
offered and Congressman Hays' motion to table was that although there
would at least be a vote on House acceptance of Cooper-Church, not a
minute's debate on the desirability of such acceptance or on the underlying constitutional issues would take place on the floor of the United
138
States House of Representatives.
The attempt to table the motion to instruct conferees passed the
House, 237-153. Although those voting in favor of tabling the motion
to instruct could argue that they were voting only against tying the
hands of House conferees rather than against Cooper-Church, it was
generally understood by most House members that the vote on tabling
was, in effect, the only House vote which would occur on the CooperChurch amendment. Its results may fairly be interpreted as a measure
of House sentiment on the question of reasserting Congress' constitutional role in national security policy making.
C.

Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit the Armed
Forces to Combat

The Foreign Military Sales Act which the House of Representatives
sent to conference in such deplorable fashion never emerged. It was
often predicted by opponents of Cooper-Church during the Senate
debate that House conferees would never agree to such a limitation on
presidential warmaking power. The conferees apparently reached an
impasse and decided simply to let the bill die in conference.
The final irony of the congressional debate, or non-debate in the
House, over the Cooper-Church amendment is that the President himself apparently came to accept the constitutionality of some limitation
on his autonomy: even though the Cooper-Church amendment itself
never emerged from conference, 139 a similar restriction1 40 finally did
pass both houses and was signed into law.
138 Representative Hays, to his credit, later tried to obtain unanimous consent to
withdraw his motion to table, but this was objected to by several Republicans who were
only too happy to see the Democratic leadership saddled with responsibility for suppressing
debate on the Cooper-Church amendment.
139 Chicago Tribune, Dec. 16, 1970, § 1, at 9.
140 But the limitation on aid to Cambodia which finally passed Congress as part of the
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In light of the congressional deadlock over Cooper-Church itself, the
question of whether that amendment, had it passed the House in its
original form and been signed into law by the President, would have
imposed any legally enforceable restraint on the President's power to
commit United States forces to combat abroad is academic. Almost
certainly it would have, despite the disclaimer of intent to limit the
President's constitutional powers, because the effect of the amendment
turned ultimately on Congress' appropriations authority, a basis for
congressional control of executive action which no one has seriously
questioned.
What is almost more important than the direct effect of CooperChurch, however, is the indirect effect which the seven weeks of senatorial consideration have had on both Congress and the President. As
Senator Robert Dole, a staunch supporter of the President's position
on Cooper-Church, summarized it just before the vote on the amendment:
. . . I submit that the past 7 weeks will be recognized as
one of the greatest, most productive debates in the history of
this body. Not only has a major legislative measure been
hammered out and refined, but some of the most significant
legislative history in decades has been created. It has been a
rare occasion when so many Members of this body have given
such attention to a matter with the constitutional significance
of the balance of the war powers between the legislative and
executive branches of Government. This debate will stand as
a valuable guide for the Congress, the President and constitutional scholars for years to come. 141
Even the few months since the debate on Cooper-Church have begun
to prove the truth of Senator Dole's commentary. The Senate itself has
added, almost without debate, a limitation to the Defense Department
appropriations bill for fiscal year 1971 limiting expenditures in line
with the restrictions first outlined in the Cooper-Church amendment.
Moreover, it is likely that in the future both the President, whoever
he may be, and the Congress will consider seriously the constitutional
issues involved in foreign policy and military commitment decisions.
With these results following despite its lack of legislative success, the
Cooper-Church amendment may be said to have made a valuable contribution to the constitutional history of the nation. Not even the
recent extension into Laos detracts from the constitutional importance
Supplemental Foreign Assistance Authorization Bill was significantly different from the
original Cooper-Church amendment in that it contained no limit on air operations over
Cambodia.
141 116 CoNG. REc. S10269 (daily ed. June 30, 1970).
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of the Cooper-Church debate. While the spirit of the Cooper-Church
limitation is offended more than a little by the extension of the war into
Laos, the White House rhetoric emphasizes the President's meticulous
compliance with congressional directives. What emerges from these
most recent events is an obvious imperative for members of Congress
to be more skillful draftsmen if they want to limit executive adventures
into war.
V.

CONCLUSION-THE 91ST CONGRESS AND THE

CONSTITUTION

How did the 91st Congress get along with the Constitution? At best,
it was an armed truce.
While some distinctions can be drawn between the treatment of
constitutional questions by the two chambers, it is not an overstatement
to say that many members of Congress look on their oath to support
the Constitution more as a patriotic gesture than as a serious part of
their function. Both bodies contain members who cheerfully put off on
the courts most if not all of the responsibility for squaring the statute
with the Constitution.
The clearest difference between the two houses in large part turns on
the easier debate rules in the Senate. As a result, the Senators do most of
their constitutional cogitating in public. While this makes it somewhat
easier to study the patterns into which such constitutional debate falls,
it also demonstrates the difficulty in attempting to separate the constitutional arguments from the arguments of necessity, convenience,
policy or just plain politics. Nor is it surprising to find that where other
questions are not overpowering, the Constitution gets a better shake.
Thus, in 18-year-old voting, given the overwhelming consensus for the
merits, constitutional debate predominated.
Both houses of Congress appear to make extensive use of constitutional scholars, although the exact effect which this high-level research
and argumentation has on the votes of individual legislators is difficult
to determine, and in any case varies according to the "pragmatics"
involved in the legislative proposal. It is clear that in some cases the
policy predilections of Senators or Congressmen easily tip the scales
against the weightiest of constitutional arguments. On the other hand,
there are occasions-as in the case of the 18-year-old vote-where constitutional scholarship plays a decisive role in determining a legislative
course of action.
There does seem to be a discernible difference in the way Congress
approaches the problem of legislating in the face of a constitutional
prohibition on the exercise of governmental power-a "Bill of Rights"
prohibition-and how it reacts when the question is one of determining
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the extent of express grants of legislative power to Congress itself. In
the former case, the attitude is often one of hostility and unwillingness
to accept any alleged limitation on congressional power to act. The
result in such cases is often a court interpretation of congressional
intent which considerably narrows-and thus saves-the scope of the
statute. The judicial alternative is to declare that Congress has transgressed the boundaries on its constitutional power, a decision courts
are reluctant to make.
On the other hand, when Congress bases legislation on an express
grant of power found in the Constitution, the extent of which is
uncertain or problematical, it seems far more conscientious and careful
in attempting to fathom the true limitations of its power. Examples
are the reluctant enactment of a statute to lower the voting age and the
initial failure of congressional action to increase the weight of its own
voice in the use of military forces.
Having once drawn these rather general conclusions about the significance of constitutional argumentation in the House and Senate, what
may be said more generally about the value of constitutional analysis
in the national legislative process? In certain cases, where it is well
established that the federal courts, especially the Supreme Court, will
ultimately consider the constitutional merits of congressional action,
constitutional analysis and debate serve the function of avoiding that
kind of confrontation between coordinate branches of government
which could destroy the mutual forbearance and tolerance which have
kept our tripartite government intact for almost two centuries. Were
Congress to exercise no discretion of its own and view each claim of
constitutional limitation on its power as a potential confrontation with
the judicial branch, neither the courts nor the Congress could long
continue to play a constructive role in the business of governing.142
Given the fact that the Constitution, somewhat like the flag, is
viewed by many as an emblem of orthodoxy and the exclusive property
of a portion of the body politic, the old girl has fared reasonably well
for her age. While the last session of Congress may not have revered her
as it ought, neither was she done in.
The United States Constitution has proven its ability to withstand
142 See, for example, the confrontation over the printing of a House Internal Security
Committee report listing campus speakers and the fees they received. In response to an
injunction issued by a federal district court prohibiting publication of the so-called
"blacklist," the House of Representatives passed a resolution ordering the printing of the
report. 116 CoNG. Rac. H11606-25 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1970). The Resolution in effect
"enjoined" the district court which had enjoined the printing. The next step logically
would have been for the district court to call out the Army and the Congress to call out
the Marines.
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the stresses and strains of careless legislation for nearly two hundred
years. There is no reason to assume that this venerable document has
suddenly lost its capacity to survive these assaults; but there is also no
reason to throw the Constitution into needless jeopardy. Congress
would do well to spend less time bragging about the document and
more time on the care and feeding.

